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ABSTRACT 
 
Prior to the 1899 Federal Revolution, Sucre elite used the memory of Chuquisaca 
independence exploits to justify their rule and imagine a future for the Bolivian nation. 
These symbols became widespread in the Bolivian public sphere and were the dominant 
national discourse for the Bolivian nation. However, dissatisfied highland elite began 
crafting an alternative national project and these two competing Nationalisms clashed and 
eventually led to the 1899 Federal Revolution. Following the war, the Liberal Party 
allowed and even supported a continuation of the Sucre based origin story in the Valley 
regions of Bolivia. This has created ideas of “Sucrense exceptionalism,” the discourse has 
been used continually to make political demands, and it was one of the underlying causes 
of the 2008 act of racial violence that took place in Sucre, Bolivia.
  
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................... iii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: INDEPENDENCE MEMORY IN SUCRE........................................1 
 
CHAPTER 2: FIRST DEBATES ABOUT THE LOCATION OF THE BOLIVIAN CAPITAL ..................9 
CHAPTER 3: THE ORIGINS OF SUCRE INDEPENDENCE MEMORY ..........................................27 
CHAPTER 4: “SOY SUCRENSE”: A RECONCILIATION OR AN UNEASY PEACE ........................49 
CHAPTER 5: INDEPENDENCE MEMORY AND RACISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY ........................68 
EPILOGUE............................................................................................................................79 
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................82 
  
  
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: INDEPENDECE MEMORY IN SUCRE 
In the midst of the 1899 Federal Revolution a resident of Sucre attempted to 
clarify the issue that lay at the heart of Bolivia’s regional conflict. This Sucrense elite 
suggested that the upstart Liberal Party, which was headquartered in La Paz, wanted to 
usurp power from the traditional Conservative political machine located in Sucre. 
According to him, the La Paz based Liberal Party wanted to “dominate all of Bolivia,” 
they wanted to move the capital to La Paz, they wanted to control all elected positions, 
and above all Paceños “want Sucre to be converted into a canton like Cochabamba, 
Potosi, Oruro, Tarija, Santa Cruz, and Beni.”1 The anxieties of the Sucre resident were 
well founded, and only four months later a number of his prophetic concerns came to 
fruition. As a result of the Liberal Party’s victory in the 1899 conflict, the seat of 
government moved to La Paz, the Sucre based oligarchy lost political power, and Sucre 
no longer exclusively held the title of capital in Bolivia.2
                                                           
1 El Buen Sentido, January 9, 1899, p. 1 ABNB: PBCH 296 
2 Bolivia is one of only a handful of countries that have two capitals. Sucre retains the nominal title and is 
the seat of the Bolivian Supreme court, but La Paz is the true seat of government and is generally now 
regarded as the official capital of Bolivia. 
  
2 
Notably listed in his anxieties was the notion that Sucre might become relegated 
to a canton no different from numerous other departmental capitals in Bolivia. This 
concern pre-supposed that Sucre had a justifiably privileged place within the Bolivian 
nation. Sucre was more than just a canton, and the potential demotion to the level of a 
major city like Cochabamba or Santa Cruz was preposterous and just as offensive as the 
Liberals’ regionally advantageous political maneuvering. This article will attempt to 
explore this reference to an intellectual project that defined Sucre as the preeminent city 
of Bolivia in the years leading up to the 1899 federal revolution. My focus will center on 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in the years surrounding the Bolivian 
Federal Revolution of 1899, but the discursive tropes identified during this era remain the 
bedrock of a regional discourse in twenty first century Sucre. 
I will argue that the intellectual elite of Sucre adopted a public discourse which 
attached their regional identity to Chuquisaca’s historic role during Bolivia’s struggle for 
independence. In particular, the Sucrense elite claimed the May 25, 1809 Chuquisaca-
based, royalist uprising as the first call for independence in the Spanish Americas and 
argued that Sucre was the true birthplace of the modern Bolivian nation. Early on, the 
discourse almost exclusively celebrated male Creole independence leaders such as Jaime 
Zudáñez and Juan Manuel Lemoine. As the Liberal Party continued to grow in political 
power and the threat of regional conflict escalated, Sucre elite began to allow the 
celebration of a broader range of independence actors, including mestizos such as Jose 
Vicente Camargo and women like Juana Azurduy in order to gain broader support for 
their nation building project. Despite this more inclusive historical account, Sucre elite 
went to great lengths to maintain ambiguous stances on the racial makeup of their region 
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and these independence figures. Instead of using racial categories to explain their 
privileged position, political leaders of Sucre stressed their role as the founders of the 
Bolivian Nation. Ethnic considerations were relegated to highland populations, and in 
particular Aymara groups, who served as the villanized “other.”3 This process allowed 
the Sucre elite to downplay their own indigenous ancestry, while still using a complex 
mixture of ethnic and regional explanations to justify Bolivia’s sociopolitical hierarchy.4  
These racially ambiguous symbols of Independence were used to narrate a 
preferred history of Bolivia that began on May 25, 1809, when Chuquisaca residents first 
challenged Spanish colonial role. In effect, this telling of Bolivian history downplayed 
the importance of the pre-conquest, indigenous past and to a lesser extent the colonial era 
of Bolivian history.5 Consequently, this Bolivian origin story allowed Sucre elite to claim 
that their city had a long tradition of modern, progressive, and democratic political 
activity; therefore, they had the only justifiable claim to political power in Bolivia. 
Throughout the late 19th century, this emblematic narrative became the major justification 
for the Conservative oligarchy’s privileged place in politics and was used to contest 
Liberal economic based assertions for more political power. While the Conservatives lost 
their control over Bolivia’s political sphere, their regional discourse remained remarkably 
enduring, and a variation of their narrative still serves to define present day identities in 
Chuquisaca.  
                                                           
3 For more on the idea of the cultural other see: Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1979) 
4 Their ambiguous stance on race also allowed them to avoid awkwardly embracing European conceptions 
of whiteness that most in Bolivia could not live up to 
5 There are other case studies in Latin America where scholars have found similar phenomenon: Rebecca 
Earle, “’Padres de La Patria’ and the ancestral past: commemorations of Independence in nineteenth-
century Spanish America.” Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 34 No. 4(2002). Pp. 775-805 
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 Despite the importance of regional identity in contemporary Bolivia, relatively 
few scholars have investigated the historical basis for the country’s geographic divisions. 
Scholarship has treated regionalism as a relatively recent phenomenon, and scholars 
typically explore the more contemporary regional rivalry between Santa Cruz and the 
highland regions instead of looking at other regional divisions.6 In large measure, this is 
due to the rather limited exploration of the 1899 Federal Revolution, which was an 
important turning point in the development of modern Bolivia. The scholarship on this 
era has a heavy focus on La Paz and the victorious Liberal Party, with heightened 
attention to the military actions and the eventual political trials of Pablo Zárate Willka.7 
These works have debated the political motives of Willka and the villianization of 
Aymara groups in the aftermath of the conflict. Further, these works have elucidated the 
Liberal Party’s Nation building discourse based on the Indigenous past, which was used 
to represent La Paz and the highland region. However, scholars have paid relatively little 
attention to the losing Conservative Party and the department of Chuquisaca.  The few 
studies that do treat the region suggest that highland and valley intellectuals reconciled in 
the aftermath of the Civil War, because both groups of elite feared the potential for a race 
                                                           
6 The works that do look at regionalism almost exclusively look at Santa Cruz and the Bolivian lowlands: 
Jose Luis Roca, Fisonomia del Regionalismo Boliviano, (La Paz: Editorial Los Amigos del Libro, 1980); 
Jose Luis Roca, “Regionalism Revisited” in John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead eds., Unresolved 
Tensions: Bolivia Past and Present (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008)  pp.61-82; Rossana 
Barragan, “Oppressed or Privileged Regions?: Some Historical Reflections on the Use of State Resources” 
in John Crabtree and Laurence Whitehead ed., Unresolved Tensions: Bolivia Past and Present, (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008) pp. 83-104 
7 Ramiro Condarco Morales, Zarate ‘El Temible’ Willka: Historia de la rebelión indígena de 1899 (La Paz: 
Talleres Graficos, 1965). Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui, “Oppressed but not Defeated”: Peasant Struggles 
among the Aymara and Qhechwa in Bolivia, 1900-1980, (Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for 
Social Development, 1987); Forrest Hylton and Sinclair Thomson, Revolutionary Horizons: Past and 
Present in Bolivian Politics (London: Verso, 2007). Forrest Hylton, “Reverberations of Insurgency: Indian 
Communities, the federal war of 1899, and the Regeneration of Bolivia.”PhD diss., New York University, 
2010. ProQuest (250869905); E. Gabrielle Kuenzli, Acting Inca: National Belonging in Early Twentieth-
Century Bolivia. (Pittsburgh; University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013);  
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war led by the Aymaras.8  While both groups of regional elite may have agreed to 
villianize the Aymara, I contend that these regions continued to disagree on a number of 
key issues on the future of the Bolivian nation. Perhaps elite reconciled politically; 
however, culturally the elite of Sucre continued to espouse discourses that reflected local 
interests over national ones.  Therefore, it is necessary to study the Conservative Party’s 
nation building project prior to the war in order to truly understand the reconciliatory 
nature of the postwar era. This analysis of the Conservative Party’s former nation 
building project will also provide a greater understanding of what the Liberal Party 
attempted to change, and it will help to explain the roots of Sucre’s regional identities 
that continue to this day.9  
 Exploring the use of independence memory will not only unveil the historical 
roots of Bolivia’s regional identities, but it will also add to our historical understanding of 
Latin America’s independence legacy. There is a vast amount of scholarship on the 
independence era, but much less has been written about the ways independence memory 
has been appropriated in the postcolonial republican era10 A few recent works have 
                                                           
8 Beatriz Rossells Montalvo. “La ‘Reconciliación’ De Las Elites Intelectuales Después De La Guerra Civil 
(1898-1899): Los Caminos De La Violencia Étnica.” Estudios Bolivianos No. 17; Hylton and Thomson, 
Revolutionary Horizons 
9 There is an extensive scholarship on regionalism in Latin America, but scholars have not often used 
regions to analyze the Bolivian case study:  Nancy P. Appelbaum, Muddied Waters: Race, Region, and 
Local History in Columbia, 1846-1948, (Durham, Duke University Press, 2003), Peter Wade, Blackness 
and Race Mixture: The Dynamics of Racial Identity in Colombia, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993), Barbara Weinstein, “Racializing Regional Difference: Sao Paulo versus Brazil, 1932” in Race 
and Nation in Modern Latin America, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003) 
10 John Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions 1808-1826, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
1973); José Luis Roca, 1809: La Revolución de la Audiencia de Charcas en Chuquisaca y en La Paz, (La 
Paz: Plural Editores,1998); Javier Mendoza Pizarro, La Mesa Coja: Historia de la Proclama de la Junta 
Tuitiva del 16 de Julio de 1809, (La Paz: Plural Editores, 2009), Aline Helg, Liberty and Equality in 
Caribbean Colombia, 1770-1835, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Eric Van 
Young, The Other Rebellion: Popular Violence, Ideology, and the Mexican Struggle for Independence, 
1810-1821, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001); John Tutino, From Insurrection to Revolution in 
Mexico: Social Bases of Agrarian Violence 1750-1940, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) 
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started to look at how nation states appropriated historical symbols to legitimize their rule 
and to forge national communities.11 Nevertheless, most of these works have only 
tangentially addressed the ways nation builders used independence memory to imagine 
their nations.  By looking at the political and intellectual debates over independence 
memory this study will not only enhance the understanding of nation building, but it will 
also explore the long term legacy of the independence movements and how the uses of 
their memory continued to impact citizens of Latin American nations. 
Numerous scholars have explored the ways in which memory functions as a 
collective experience, and scholars have noted its uses in nation building projects.12 
These works have been critiqued by a revisionist wave of memory scholarship that has 
shown how memory is both collective but also contested, fragmented, and used for 
political purposes for differing groups.13 Approaching the independence era from this 
perspective will help to explore the legacy of independence and hopefully move 
scholarship away from direct comparisons with mythicized European and North 
American depictions of the age of revolutions. Far too often, these studies expect 
independence to immediately live up to the promises of enlightenment thought.14 This is 
an unrealistic expectation, and using memory to explore a more “lounge duree” view of 
                                                           
11 Ferrer, Insurgent Cuba; Earle, The Return of the Native; Lasso, Myths of Harmony; Kuenzli, Acting Inca 
12 Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, trans. Francis J. Ditter Jr. and Vida Yazdi, (Harper & Row, 
1980); Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, Vol. 1-Conflicts and Divisions, trans. 
Arthur Goldhammer, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996);  Rebecca Earle, The Return of the 
Native; David W. Blight, American Oracle: The Civil War in the Civil Rights Era (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 2013)   
13 Joanne Rappaport, Cumbe Reborn: An Andean Ethnography of History (Chicago: University of Chicago 
press, 1994) Steve J. Stern, Remembering Pinochet’s Chile: On the Eve of London 1998, (Durham: Duke 
University Press 2006); Kuenzli, Acting Inca 
14 Other works have explored the memory of Independence including: Phillip Deloria, Playing Indian, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998; William H. Beezley and David E. Lorey eds., Viva Mexico! 
Viva Independencia!: Celebrations of September 16, (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc, 2001);); 
Hendrik Kraay, Days of National Festivity in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1832-1889, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2013) 
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independence will help to enhance our understanding of the true impacts independence, 
and its memories, have had in post-colonial Latin America. 
 Exploring the elite debates around the future of the Bolivian nation in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries not only allows for the exploration of Latin American political 
and intellectual histories, but it permits a better historical understanding of the long term 
impact of historical discourses and regional identities. While the city of Sucre has not 
held the seat of government of Bolivia in more than a century, the issue of the Capital is 
still a highly contentious point that has recently led to overt acts of violence. In the 2007 
constitutional convention following the election of Evo Morales, the number one demand 
by residents of Sucre was the full return of the seat of government to their city. In the 
midst of intense debates about Bolivia’s political future and the proper location for the 
country’s capital, a group of indigenous men from rural Chuquisaca were overrun by a 
hoard of angry Sucre residents as they tried to support peacefully the visiting Evo 
Morales on May 24, 2008.15 After they were detained, the indigenous marchers were hit 
repeatedly, forced to strip down to their pants, and were forced to bow down in front of 
the Casa de La Libertad. In front of this museum commemorating Bolivian independence, 
these indigenous men sat on their knees and listened to the crowd sing the Himno a 
Chuquisaca, and watch as the crowd burned the wiphala.16 Throughout this episode of 
racial violence, the residents of Sucre relied on language that eerily resembled the nation 
building discourses that dominated Sucre a century earlier. In between insults hurled 
                                                           
15 “Sucre, Capital del Racismo,” YouTube video, 4:40, posted by “Sucretino,” May 26, 2008, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J2s15Mjgn9o,  
16 The Wiphala is a flag that carries important representative power for the indigenous communities of the 
Andes, and has become one of the official flags of Bolivia under the Morales presidency. The Himno al 
Chuquisaca is the equivalent to a state song and makes direct reference to the memory of the May 25th 
uprising that that serves as the emblematic moment for the city. 
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towards Evo Morales, there were chants of “Sucre is respected, damn it” and “We are 
Sucrenses,” which once again posited a view of Sucre as exceptional in comparison to the 
rest of Bolivia.17  
Recently, historians have attempted to explore the historical origins of the 
outbursts of racism in Sucre, and scholars have focused heavily on the 2008 incident.18 
However, their studies have used historical case studies from the highland regions to 
explain the roots of this skirmish, which took place in the valley region.19 In order to truly 
explore the long term causes of this incident, it is necessary to explore the local history of 
Sucre and the department of Chuquisaca. It is to this task that we now turn. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
17 “Sucre, Capital del Racismo,” YouTube 4:40 
18 Laura Gotkowitz ed., Histories of Race and Racism: The Andes and Mesoamerica from Colonial Times 
to the Present, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011); Pamela Calla ed., Observando el Racismo: 
Racismo y Regionalismo en el Proceso Constituyente, (La Paz: Defensor del Pueblo y Universidad de la 
Cordillera, 2008) 
19 Gotkowitz ed., Histories of Race and Racism 
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CHAPTER 2 
FIRST DEBATES ABOUT THE LOCATION OF THE CAPITAL 
On April 16, 1891, Eloy Martinez, the former president of an important 
intellectual organization called the Geographical Society of Sucre, sent a letter to the 
President of the municipal council of the Bolivian Capital, Valentin Abecia. In this letter, 
Martinez expressed the desire to increase public knowledge of the role the city of Sucre 
played in the independence movements. Martínez wrote, “you find in your possession 
various documents of historical importance, related to the Bolivian independence 
movements. We have agreed to entrust you with…our historical work on the events of 
May 25, 1809, in order to give greater ceremony to this event, which capital should 
celebrate in commemoration of the first cry for liberty and American emancipation.”20 A 
month later, this letter along with the collection of historical documents was published by 
the municipal council of Sucre in celebration of the eighty second anniversary of the 
Sucre based uprising of May 25, 1809.  
This publicly produced volume of documents includes a brief synopsis of the 
independence exploits of Chuquisaca residents along with a telling explanation for the 
reason behind their publication. According to the author, there was a dearth of 
information on the Bolivian independence struggles and in particular the heroic exploits 
in the city of Sucre. Abecia complained, “the history of our independence has many 
                                                           
20 Eloy Martinez “Foreward” in Valentin Abecia Baldivieso’s  Resena historica del 25 de mayo de 1809 en 
Sucre, capital de Bolivia. (Sucre, 1891) 
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absences, and it could be said to be in an embryonic state.”21  However, the author 
remained optimistic and openly hoped that this published collection would help to move 
the history of independence past the embryonic stage. The author’s goal is very 
straightforward, but it is unclear why Martinez, Abecia, and the other elite of Sucre had a 
sudden impetus to research and publish information about Bolivia’s independence era. 
While there is no direct answer to this question in the document, the president of Sucre’s 
municipal council does leave a hint in his opening contribution to the edited volume. 
Abecia states explicitly that he longed for the day “when historical criteria will replace 
local passions;-- to solemnize the anniversary of May 25, 1809 in which Charcas dazzled 
the new world with first lights of liberty…to announce the awakening of America.”22 
Abecia’s passing reference to “local passions” is key to understanding this publication 
and the sudden desire to uncover the true history of Bolivia’s independence movements.  
During this era, a new economic elite from La Paz were beginning to question their own 
political marginalization and whether Bolivia’s governmental powers should reside in 
Sucre. With crashing silver prices and rising tin exports, mine owners in La Paz now 
played a bigger role in the success of the Bolivian economic sphere. However, this new 
highland elite did not feel that the distribution of governmental resources reflected their 
region’s contributions to the nation’s budgets. Feeling slighted by the conservative 
oligarchy, these new highland elite started a campaign to contest the city of Sucre’s 
control of political power and to suggest a new system of government based on a 
decentralized style of federalism.23 In 1889, two politicians from the Liberal Party, Jose 
                                                           
21 Ibid, p. 3 
22 Ibid p. 3 
23 Kuenzli, Acting Inca p. 25;  
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Carrasco and Arano Peredo, proposed for the first time a piece of legislation to move the 
capital from Sucre to La Paz and to enact a more federalist policy. This direct assault on 
the Conservative Party’s political hegemony sent the Conservative elite of Sucre into a 
frenzy to justify their claim for political power. As the their privileged position in politics 
was being called into question, Martinez, Abecia, and numerous other Sucre residents 
turned to the memory of independence to help justify their positions of power and to 
contest the transition of  the capital of Bolivia. 
The origins of this parliamentary call to transition the capital from Sucre to La 
Paz arose from the post-colonial struggles that faced the young Bolivian nation. In the 
early years of the republic, Bolivia was a country in turmoil. Following three hundred 
years of Spanish colonization, a series of massive indigenous uprisings in the late 
eighteenth century, and a protracted struggle for independence, the early governments of 
Bolivia struggled economically and politically.24 As a result of these governmental 
constraints, most scholars have argued that post-colonial Bolivia retained a bureaucratic 
structure similar to that of the preceding colonial period. In particular, scholars have 
pointed to the persistence of Indigenous tribute into the late nineteenth century as 
evidence that independence resulted in a nominal change in political power but rather 
insubstantial material changes.25 According to this perspective, most indigenous groups 
were able to retain autonomy in their local communities, or Ayllus, in exchange for 
                                                           
24 For a more detailed discussion on the postcolonial struggles see Brook Larson, Trials of Nation Making: 
Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810-1910 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), pp.-202-246 
25 Tristan Platt, El Ayllu y El estado Boliviano: Tierra Y Tributo en El Norte de Potosí, (Lima: Instituto de 
Estudios Peruanos, 1982); Larson, Trials of Nation Making. 
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payment of the indigenous tribute the incorporation into a republic was hardly felt by 
most Bolivians.26  
However with a sharp spike in international silver prices in the 1860s, Bolivia’s 
traditional mining industries began to rebound after a long period of neglect.27  Following 
this economic boom the political leaders started a new liberalizing campaign to 
modernize the Bolivian nation. Inspired by developments in Europe and the United 
States, Creole elite hoped to renovate their country in order to conform to western 
standards of progress and modernity. In late nineteenth century, this liberalizing trend 
was enacted through a land privatization act called the 1874 Ley de ex-vinculacion which 
was designed to break up communal landholdings in indigenous communities as the 
government no longer counted on the indigenous tribute as their main source of revenue. 
Further nation building elite pushed for railroad development, a federalist system 
designed to give greater political autonomy to regions, and an interest in integrating the 
nation with telegraph lines.28 Representing the hope in new technology, a Bolivian living 
in Montevideo, Joaquin de Lemoine, wrote of the promises of telegraph technology. In 
1881, de Lemoine suggested that his home nation needed to adopt this new technology 
because telegraph lines could serve “as arteries of our social organism, indispensable for 
the vitality of Bolivia.”29 Lemoine’s view of the importance of public investments and 
western styled progress are representative of many creole elite in late nineteenth century 
Latin America. Investments in railways, mining, and telegraphs along with land 
                                                           
26 Platt, El Ayllu y El Estado Boliviano, Larson, Trials of Nation Making 
27 Larson, Trials of Nation Making, p. 213. 
28 Larson, Trials of Nation Making; Herbert Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
29 Joaquin de Lemoine, Intereses  Económicos, Telégrafos Bolivianos, (Montevideo, 1881) 
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privatization, federalism, and international trade were assumed to be the key to future of 
many nineteenth century nations.30 
As these modernizing goals were being enacted by Bolivia’s lettered elite, the 
Andes became enflamed in regional warfare between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia over 
valuable mineral deposits. This so called “War of the Pacific”, resulted in a crushing 
blow to Bolivia’s national prestige and the loss of the country’s only access to the Pacific 
Ocean. In addition to this setback, the international silver trade began to collapse as 
countries throughout the world started making the shift to the gold standard. Despite 
these stumbling blocks, the lettered elite of the valley regions were able to institutionalize 
their power, and they continued their goal of modernizing the Bolivian nation. These 
silver mining elite accomplished this by forming the Conservative Party in the 1880s, 
which went on to use electoral fraud to hold at bay the constant challenges from the 
Liberal Party. Despite these constant challenges, the Conservatives held control of the 
Bolivian political sphere until the federal revolution of 1899. 
Despite their institutionalized political power, the Conservative Party’s oligarchic 
hold over the Bolivia nation enraged a large portion of their constituency. Some members 
of the Indigenous communities in the highlands and valley regions protested the 
increased assaults on their communal living arrangements.31 The Conservative Party was 
very aware of the dangers of a dissatisfied indigenous majority since they still held 
communal memories of the age of Andean Rebellions in Sucre.32  To complicate matters, 
                                                           
30 See: Todd A. Diacon, Stringing Together a Nation: Candido Mariano da Silva Rondon and the 
Construction of a Modern Brazil, 1906-1930 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004) 
31 Silva Rivera Cusicanqui, Oppressed but not Defeated; Hylton and Thomson, Revolutionary Horizons 
32 For a discussion of these Rebellions and their legacies see: Steve Stern ed., Resistance, Rebellion, and 
Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World 18th to 20th Centuries, (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1987); Charles F. Walker, Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780-
1840, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999) Sinclair Thomson, We Alone Will Rule: Native Andean 
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elite from other regions felt the Conservative Party was not serving their needs, and they 
began to demand political and structural changes. This can be seen most forcefully in the 
demand to transition the capital of 1889 from the opening vignette, although there were 
numerous other intellectual debates calling for policy changes as well.33 
The Conservative elite from Sucre took these challenges seriously because they 
understood that their claim to political power was tenuous as a result of the growing 
tensions from Indigenous groups and elite from other regions. In particular, the Sucrense 
elite knew they did not have a strong claim for retaining the capital in their regional 
strong hold. Despite serving as the capital of Bolivia for the first eight decades after 
independence, the national government had actually met in a number of different 
locations over the course of this time period. According to the 1900 Bolivian census, the 
Nation’s political representatives had met for congresses in not only Sucre but also La 
Paz, Tapacari, Cochabamaba, and Oruro over the first several decades of the Bolivian 
national period.34 Part of the reason for the transitory nature of National Congresses in 
Bolivia was a result of the city of Sucre being ill suited to serve as the seat of 
government.  One North American traveler even noted on his travels that “Sucre is made 
the legal capital, but neither it nor any other city has both the size and the central position 
that would qualify to act as a unifying force.”35 Despite their colonial past as a center for 
the Silver mining barons, the city of Sucre lacked the ideal size and infrastructure to serve 
as the seat of government for the Bolivian nation.  The Conservative elite of Sucre were 
                                                           
Politics in the Age of Insurgency (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2002); Sergio Serulnikov, 
Revolution in the Andes: The Age of Tupac Amaru, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013); Charles F. 
Walker, The Tupac Amaru Rebellion (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard, 2014) 
33 Morales, Zarate ‘El Temible’ Willka: Historia de la rebelión indígena de 1899 
34 Manuel Ballivian, Censo general de la  poblacion de Bolivia, II parte historica (La Paz: Ministerio de 
Gobierno y Fomento, 1900) ANB 
35 James Bryce, South America: Observations and Impressions, (New York, 1912) Pp.193- 194 
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aware of their weak arguments to rationalize their privileged position, so they turned to 
other justifications for the continuation of Sucre as the political capital of Bolivia. 
Since the Conservative elite no longer held sole control over the Bolivian economic 
sphere, they turned to an argument grounded on a historically based claim to justify their 
privileged status in the political sphere. In particular, the residents of Sucre found their 
strongest claims in support of their political power in the early constitutions and 
governmental decrees of the Bolivian nation. In Bolivia’s 1825 constitution, the 
fourteenth article denotes that “the capital city of the Republic will be called from now 
on, Sucre.”36 The Conservative elite of Sucre used this political decree along with another 
one from 1839 to claim that Sucre justifiably served as the Capital of Bolivia. The 1839 
decree gave them further evidence that their region should continue to serve as the seat of 
government since this law explicitly stated “the city of Chuquisaca is the Capital of the 
Republic, and comforting with the law of August 11, 1825, will be called from here 
forward the city of Sucre.”37 After the original call to shift the capital to La Paz, elite 
from Sucre began to republish these documents in public newspapers in order to help 
justify their continued control of the Bolivian capital and in extension control of political 
power.38 
As they started to disseminate these early governmental decrees, they also started 
to publish a series of biographies of independence figures from the valley regions of 
Bolivia. Part of this sudden push is the result of a broader cultural trend to commemorate 
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the independence era in Latin America during this epoch.39 This played out throughout 
Latin America, and the Bolivian case is no exception. In 1885 the famous Bolivian 
statesman and writer from Cochabamba, Nataniel Aguirre, published the novel Juan de 
La Rosa: Memoirs of the Last Soldier of the Independence Movement.40 This novel 
celebrates the memory of the independence era, and Aguirre also included his own 
commentary on Bolivia’s contemporary struggles to form a national identity. Through the 
novel, Aguirre uses the fictitious De La Rosa, the last surviving member of the 
independence wars, to weigh in on a number of contemporary issues facing the Bolivian 
nation including the economic policies of the country and important questions about the 
racial make-up and modernizing potential for the Bolivian nation.  
Similarly, the Sucre elite used approaches to representing independence exploits that 
were comparable to Aguirre and other elite throughout Latin America. The Sucrense elite 
republished these early documents and spent extensive time researching independence 
leaders to justify their privileged position in Bolivian politics and to express their specific 
modernizing political platforms.  Specifically, they began to celebrate the actions of 
Chuquisaca resident on May 25, 1809, which they began to claim as the first call for 
independence. Writing in 1893, one author explicitly made this claim by arguing “May 
25, 1809 was then the day that was shouted the first cry of liberty and independence from 
the noble city of Sucre.”41  These cultural trends that dominated the time period helped to 
shape the Conservatives’ intellectual discourses and political projects. 
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Despite the growing debates about the nation’s future and the numerous 
disgruntled constituents in late nineteenth century Bolivia, the Conservative Party was 
able to maintain their institutionalized power for another decade. During this time they 
were able to craft a governmental policy that supported the interests of the valley regions 
of Bolivia and in particular the city of Sucre. Most importantly, the Conservative political 
leaders were able to craft economic and foreign policy that encouraged the international 
exports of Bolivia’s mining industries. A noteworthy example of this is the Conservative 
Party’s quick attempts to restore international relations with Chile after the “War of the 
Pacific,” so as not to disrupt international trade. According to one Liberal leaning 
newspaper, “The president began by announcing that our relations with all foreign 
nations, and especially with our neighbors, are satisfactory and an environment of 
cordiality is maintained.”42 The Liberal writer went on to editorialize that this 
characterization of international relations was “outside reality” and that this was only the 
Conservative Party’s desire to profit economically. Following the War of the Pacific, 
regional relations were tense despite President Alonso’s claims. In addition to these 
regionally advantageous political and economic policies, the Conservative Party began to 
enact a series of construction projects influenced by the cultural time period in order to 
reshape and modernize the capital of Bolivia. 
The numerous construction projects carried out over the last decade of the 
nineteenth century help to reveal the preferential treatment that the Conservative Party 
gave to the city of Sucre. Although some historians have tried to debunk the claim that 
some regions have been privileged by the central government, there is evidence to 
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suggest that Sucre received a disproportional amount of funding for construction projects 
in the years leading up to 1899.43  In the span of ten years, the city of Sucre saw a 
massive regeneration of their cityscape, including the construction of a new National 
Palace and a brand new city theater, which they named after the independence leader Jose 
Antonio de Sucre. The National Palace and the Great Mariscal de Ayacucho Theater are 
but a couple of the numerous construction projects that sprung up during the waning 
years of the nineteenth century. However, they are representative examples of how the 
Conservative Party was able to use their privileged political power to gain tangible 
material gains for the city of Sucre.  
Under the presidency of Ancieto Arce Ruiz, a notable resident of Sucre, the 
construction of the National Palace began on Sucre’s Plaza 25 de Mayo in 1892. This 
governmental building was intended to be the residence for the President of the Bolivian 
nation, and its architecture was designed to represent the modernizing thrust of the 
Conservative Party. The desire to build this governmental structures probably arose due 
to the reliance of the 1839 decree in their claims that Sucre should remain the Capital of 
Bolivia. The second article of this decree stated, “the government will construct in the 
city of Sucre, the necessary buildings that the nation’s capital needs for the high powers 
of the nation, principally the legislative building.”44 With a newly uncovered reason to 
add to the city scape of Sucre, the elite commissioned the building of this structure and 
designed it in order to reflect their view of Bolivia’s future.  
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The National Palace was designed to espouse the ideals of power and progress 
that represented the Conservative Party’s conception of the Bolivian Nation. The 
structure’s classical style, white facade, and massive physical space, were meant to 
reflect the promising future of Bolivia. In particular, the building reflected a European 
aesthetic which went along with the Conservative’s nation building project. The building 
was designed to claim that Bolivia could join the ranks of modern European and North 
American nations under the paternalistic guidance of the Sucre elite. In a country were 
literacy rates hovered around ten to fifteen percent, these physical buildings not only 
served the practical purpose of housing the nation’s president but it was intended to help 
to inculcate a sense of national belonging and national pride.45  However, constructing 
the “the white city” was not cheap and in the single year of 1896 the National 
government spent a reported 60,000 Bolivianos on this construction project.46 These 
expenditures upset residents of other regions, who thought that the national budget was 
being disproportionately spent on one centralized location at the expense of the other 
needs of the nation. 
While the National Palace might have been the most physically imposing 
contribution to the Sucre cityscape, a number of other projects were under construction 
during the closing decade of the century. According to a source published in 1899, the 
department of Chuquisaca received national investments for roads and bridges in excess 
of 150,000 Bolivianos for the year of 1896.47 Furthermore, there were plans to construct 
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statues representing independence figures in the main plaza of Sucre; however, these 
plans were temporarily put on hold.  In addition to these construction projects, the city of 
Sucre received governmental funding for the construction of a city theater. According to 
the enraged La Paz resident, Claudio Q. Barrios, the “society of Chuquisaca wanted a 
dignified building to represent their illustrious past” and so they started the construction 
of a theater in Sucre.48 According to a sarcastic Barrios, “the famous theater Jose Antonio 
de Sucre, that upon conclusion will look like the temple of Janus.”49 This passing 
reference is almost certainly an allusion to the construction of the Great Mariscal of 
Ayacucho Theater, which still stands in Sucre to this day. While Barrios certainly made 
the comparison of the theater to the Roman temple of Janus in jest, the metaphor was 
appropriate. The Roman Temple of Janus was known for its central location in Rome and 
for its impressive size.50  The Great Mariscal of Ayacucho Theater was designed to show 
the greatness and potential for progress of Bolivia and the city of Sucre.  
While the Great Mariscal de Ayacucho Theater may have been intended to 
represent the contemporary greatness and future prospects of the Bolivian nation, it 
meant quite another thing to Bolivians outside of Sucre. As the sarcastic comments of 
Barrios indicated, a number of highland Bolivians were not pleased with the opulent 
spending in the capital city. Barrios oblique allusion to the temple of Janus may have 
been a sly reference to the other function of the roman building. In ancient Rome the 
Temple’s doors were used to indicate if the Roman Empire was at war. If so, Barrios 
directly connected the construction of the theater and the other projects to the Federal 
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Revolution of 1899. While Barrios is but one example, there were a number of the 
members of the new economic elite from the highland mining regions that began a strong 
backlash against the Conservative Party’s nation building project and their opulent 
spending in the city of Sucre. With the tin mining boom shifting the economic landscape, 
La Paz was the true economic center of Bolivia and leaders from that regions wanted to 
receive the benefits of these economic gains. They viewed a shift to a federalist system of 
government as the best way to contest the oligarchy in Sucre and their opulent spending 
habits.  
The Conservative Party’s Sucre-focused depictions of Bolivia as the birthplace of 
national independence, and the massive spending projects on the Capital city, generated 
tensions with the Liberal elite from the highland regions. Feeling slighted both 
economically and in terms of national representation, highland intellectuals began to 
develop a two tiered strategy to combat the Sucre centered view of Bolivia. The first of 
their strategies involved attempts to discredit the idea that Sucre was exceptional or had 
exclusive claim to heroic actions during Bolivia’s independence era. While celebrations 
of independence are often meant to unite a nation, in Bolivia which region was home to 
the first cry for independence created political tension. This strategy eventually was 
accompanied by a celebration of a pre-conquest indigenous past to show that La Paz too 
had an emblematic past worth celebrating. In particular, the Liberal Party laid claim to an 
Aymara past prior to the 1899 Federal Revolution in order to claim an equal prestige to 
their rivals from the valley regions.51  
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Initially reacting against the Sucre centered discourses, highland elite began to claim that 
their own region had played a key role in the independence era. In an 1896 History text 
book written “for the schools of the Republic,” a highland resident named Jose Maria 
Camacho downplayed the role of the May 25, 1809 uprising in Sucre that played a huge 
role in the Conservative Party’s nation building project.52 He briefly described it as “a 
movement in which the Zudáñez brothers played an important role, by providing the 
opportunity for the men from Chuquisaca, who had brave hearts and advanced ideas, to 
turn the conflict into a prelude for a revolution.”53 Camacho’s word choices in this telling 
exert reveal the tense atmosphere surrounding the regional debates of the time period. His 
choice of removing the primary action away from the men of Chuquisaca and placing the 
Zudáñez brothers, a pair on non-Sucre residents, as the true catalyst for the conflict 
diminishes the role of Chuquisaca. Further, Camacho is careful to describe this uprising 
as a “prelude” instead of an actual uprising or revolution. This lessens the importance of 
the events in Chuquisaca, and instead the author shifts the true revolutionary movements 
to the City of La Paz and the highland region. Describing the July sixteenth independence 
mobilization in La Paz, Camacho claims “this revolution of upmost transcendence, the 
first cry for emancipation in the continent, promoted by a few audacious and exalted 
gentlemen among them the popular and energetic Murillo and Gegorio and Victorio 
Lanza, the leaders most solidly imbued with the principles of liberty.”54 This La Paz 
author takes great strides to discredit the Conservative Party’s narrative of Bolivian 
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independence as the only site of revolutionary efforts, insisting that the Sucre elite share 
the heroic role of fighting for national liberation the highlands. 
This strategy was widespread in the lead up to the war, and it continued after the 
conflict. According to another highland resident speaking on behalf of La Paz, “the 
department of La Paz, we say without fear of mistake, has been the preeminent place for 
wellbeing,…meanwhile Chuquisaca, without other incentive tan their colonial fame, has 
not worked in any way to improve the nation, and only wants to enjoy foreign benefits, 
with the title of the capital of the republic, with which it has earned all its prestige.”55 
This once again diminishes the role of Chuquisaca and celebrates the Highland region in 
a positive way. These intellectual debates over the first cry for independence reflect the 
real struggles over political power going on during the era. Both regions tried to 
emphasize the positive characteristics of their region to justify their claims to political 
power of the Bolivian nation. 
However, the highland elite did not just react against and mimic Conservative 
discourses. They also adopted a creative appropriation of symbols from ancient 
indigenous empires. Numerous scholars have explored this phenomenon and they have 
shown how nation builders used idealized images of indigenous empires to glorify their 
present day nations.56 The pre-1899 La Paz Liberals are another example of using this 
strategy, and during this pre-war period they chose the ancient Aymara civilizations to 
represent their region and their party’s political projects. According to Camacho’s history 
textbook, he dates the origins of the Bolivian nation back to the Aymara civilization 
which conquered all of Bolivia. His textbook emphasizes the greatness of their 
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constructions, especially Tiahuanaco, and even explores Aymara legends and myths. This 
chapter makes a clear connection between Bolivia and the Aymaras, and in his analysis 
the Aymara past shows that Bolivians has the potential of a bright future. Furthermore, a 
whole wave of highland intellectuals used similar arguments to claim the origins of the 
South American man, and therefore the Bolivian nation, dated back to the ancient 
Aymara civilizations.57 
Camacho’s analysis of the Incas is much more tempered. His telling of Inca 
history labels the group as foreign invaders from Cuzco, and he even makes claims about 
the secondary nature of the Inca Empire. This interpretation suggests that Inca traditions 
and language are not as authentic or glorious as the Aymara ones, which predate the 
better known Inca civilization. While discussing the Quechua language, Camacho 
explained “the Incas tried to make the Quechua language obligatory for all people in their 
domain, but the resistance by the Aymara to this imposition was obstinate, but many did 
lose their original language, as is noted in the departments of Chuquisaca, Oruro, Potosi, 
and Cochabamba.”58 Camacho very cleverly is able to emphasize the importance of his 
region’s past, while also denigrating the valley region’s history in this passage. By 
suggesting that the valley regions had lost their authentic Aymara languages during the 
Inca colonial period, he is hinting that La Paz and the regions around Lake Titicaca have 
a claim to an original Bolivian-ness that the valley regions cannot claim. Therefore, this 
passage not only reflects the two divergent nation building projects, but it is also starting 
to show the developing regional antagonism of this epoch. 
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While this historical interpretation resonated in the highland regions, the elite in Sucre 
did not find Camacho’s interpretation convincing or well founded. According to a 
member of Sucre Geographical Society the debate over the origins of the American man 
were a major intellectual problem of this era. He lamented the lack of information and the 
unfounded claims by Camacho and other highland elite like him. Specifically, he found 
the evidence lacking to suggest that the Aymara race had a longer history than the Incas, 
or that this ethnic groups had controlled a large geographic territory like the 
contemporary Bolivian nation. As he bluntly claimed, “we cannot believe that the 
Quechua were dominated by the Aymara and much less that they predated them, because 
if the Aymara race would have been a dominating force during some epoch of the 
territory that today is marked by Quechua descendent, we would encounter the vestiges 
of Aymara civilization, their monuments and above all the ethnological properties of that 
race.”59 He goes on to even discredit the Aymara’s contributions to the ancient site of 
Tiahuanaco, which he suggests were built by Quechua speaking groups. The Sucre 
writers were intent on critiquing the highland interpretations of the Aymara in favor of 
celebrating the history of their region. 
The author’s central argument against such an interpretation was the lack of hard 
archeological evidence along with contemporary view of the Aymara communities as 
being backwards. According to him “how is it possible to explain the actual state of the 
Aymara race, with a previously great civilization like it is being claimed?”60 Of all the 
indigenous groups in the valley or Highland regions of Bolivia, the Aymara were seen as 
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the least capable of inclusion into the modern nation state. The author relied on these 
interpretations of Aymara backwardness to claim that it was impossible for these 
contemporary Aymara to descend from an ancient civilization. Just as the Camacho tried 
to denigrate the rival region while celebrating his own region, the writer from the 
Geographical society of Sucre did the same thing.  
These verbal exchanges surrounding the national iconography were fueled by 
serious underlying political and economic disagreements between the elite of the two 
regions. Following Liberal challenges to their Oligarchic control, the Conservative Party 
turned to early governmental documentation to justify the capital’s continued residence in 
Sucre. However, the Conservatives did not just stick to governmental decrees to justify 
their ruling power, they also began to lay claim to a glorious past for the city of Sucre. 
This telling placed Sucre as the birthplace of the Bolivian nation which was formed by 
noble Sucrenses. Coupled with the massive construction projects enacted in the City of 
Sucre, elite from other regions began to air their complaints to the broader public. 
 During this epoch, Conservatives and Liberals were beginning to envision very different 
futures for the Bolivian nation. The two parties’ partisan discourses, often based on 
regional stereotypes, started to push the Bolivia closer to open conflict. As the Bolivian 
nation got closer to war, the political discourse coming from the Conservatives in Sucre 
became better defined, and it evolved to more explicitly suggest that Sucre should retain 
the capital due to its long history of democracy and progress. The discourse portrayed 
Sucre as the emblematic city of Bolivia, and its citizens had the right to claim a status that 
was unavailable to residents from other regions. It is to these discourses and their 
implications to which we now turn.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ORIGINS OF SUCRE INDEPENDENCE MEMORY 
 To combat the political advances of their regional rivals and the Liberal Party’s 
cautious incorporation of the Aymara past into their nation narrative, Conservative elite 
developed a complex Bolivian origin story that narrated Sucre as the “cradle of Liberty” 
for South America.61 In numerous published documents intended for the literate public, 
the elite of Sucre crafted their preferred rendition of the Bolivian past. The Sucrenses’ 
regionally specific memory project placed their hometown at center stage of the 
independence chronicle. Specifically, the Conservative elite relied on the events of a May 
25, 1809 regional uprising, and the later independence military leaders from their region, 
to make the case that Sucre was the first city in South America to call for a rupture from 
the Spanish metropole. They published heroic tales of the enlightened doctors and 
lawyers from Sucre, whose actions “announced the awakening of South America” after a 
long era of colonial dormancy.62 Using the local independence figures of Jaime Zudáñez 
and Juan Manual Lemoine, the Sucre elite emphasized the glorious past of their city and 
region, while espousing their party’s political project for the future of Bolivia.  
 Throughout the published literature on the independence era, the Sucre elite 
weaved their concerns about the contemporary political debates about who should lead
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the Bolivia nation into the historical interpretations of independence narratives. In their 
writings, Sucrenses argued that the elite from the valley regions were the primary 
catalysts for the rupture from Spain. Further, they almost always indicate that these Sucre 
based independence leaders were enlightened creoles or whitened mestizos. According to 
their reading of Bolivian history, these formally educated elite created the Bolivian nation 
and helped to convince the less progressive majority that it was in their best interest to 
rebel against Spain. This paternalistic narration of Bolivian independence memory 
mirrored the Conservative Party’s model for the nation’s future. With contemporary 
Sucre residents of the Conservative Party serving the paternalistic role, Sucre elite would 
once again help Bolivia to revolutionize their country. Just as their symbolic ancestors 
had served as the leaders in breaking the chains of colonization, the contemporary Sucre 
elite would help push Bolivia into the ranks of the modern, progressive nations of Europe 
and North America.  
Using these tropes, the Sucre elite argued their tutelage would turn backwards 
indigenous groups into functioning, although subordinate, members of the Bolivian 
nation. This paternalistic path to development was essentially the same as the Liberal 
Party’s plan for Bolivia’s future in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.63 
However, the Conservative Party placed creolized Sucre residents in the role of the 
paternalistic leaders of the Bolivian nation. Therefore, Sucre writers tried to represent 
Sucre and the Chuquisaca region as more progressive, and more similar to Europe, than 
the rest of Bolivia. In such a telling, Sucre was “the intellectual center of Bolivia, the 
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cradle of liberty” and was inhabited by only whites and mestizos.64 Despite this desire, 
Sucre elite often were forced to make tenuous claims to the racial makeup of many of 
their independence figures.  
In an era dominated by scientific racism and eugenic movements, few Bolivians 
measured up to European conceptions of whiteness.65 Therefore, Sucre elite crafted their 
own eugenics discourse, which responded to European theories and addressed their 
regional rivals. Through this discourse the elite tried to remain ambiguous on the racial 
makeup of their region. This ambiguity is reflected in their narratives about the later 
independence figures like Jose Vicente Camargo and Juana Azurduy. Both of these later 
independence figure spoke Quechua and lived in parts of the valley regions that were 
regarded as indigenous. They led important political campaigns in the wars, but their 
questionable racial makeup made them problematic to include in the discourses that 
represented their region. However, due to the growing threat of the Liberal Party, Sucre 
elite began to incorporate these figures into their Bolivian origin story in order to increase 
support for their political project. Despite this inclusion, the Sucre writers took great 
strides to claim that these newly incorporated, emblematic figures were whitened 
mestizos despite their “Quechua blood” and Indigenous language skills.66  
The Sucre elite’s Bolivian origin story began with an overly ambitious Princess 
and a handful of local traitors. At least that is how the Sucre town council members of 
1891 chose to remember their city’s past. According to this historical publication, the 
independence movement erupted when residents of Sucre became concerned that the 
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broad geopolitical events happening in Europe would have an immediate impact on their 
city’s future.67 Charles IV’s abdication of the Spanish throne, the Napoleonic invasion of 
the Iberian Peninsula, and the Portuguese monarchy’s escape to the Americas, left the 
Spanish and Portuguese colonies in an uncertain predicament.68 To complicate matters, 
Sucre residents started to hear rumors that Princess Carlotta of Spain, the daughter of 
Charles IV who married King Joao VI of Portugal, intended to orchestrate the transition 
of the modern day Bolivian territory to the Portuguese crown.69 Supposedly aiding 
Princess Carlotta were the president of the Charcas region, Garcia Pizarro, and the local 
Archbishop, Benito María Moxó, who both supported this project that would transition 
territorial sovereignty to the Portuguese.70 Sucre residents sensed that Carlotta’s plot was 
imminent, so the lettered elite met to discuss their political options. The meeting, which 
included doctors, lawyers, and academic professors, outlined complaints against 
President Pizarro and in particular it questioned a celebration planned for the arrival of 
Dona Carlota in Brazil. According to the publication, this “reunion of the doctors of 
Chuquisaca, whose purpose was to contest the plots of Dona Carlotta, can be considered 
the beginning of the revolution.”71  However, Sucre residents did not rise up against 
Pizarro until their local hero Jaime Zudáñez, an educated lawyer and paternalistic 
“advocate for the poor,” was unjustly imprisoned by President Pizarro for participating in 
the reunion of doctors.72 This depiction suggests that a cross-class and cross-racial 
imagined community cast its support behind a local Sucrense elite instead of the Spanish 
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crown. Later Sucre elite interpreted this set of events as an announcement that the 
Sucrense people were ready to emerge as a national entity. 
Following this unjust arrest and a series of military fortifications made by 
President Pizarro, the doctors and lawyers of Sucre began to summon the popular classes 
into the city’s main plaza to demand the release of Zudáñez. In order to arouse the 
masses, Juan Manuel Lemoine, another important lawyer from the city of Sucre, climbed 
the tower of the San Francisco Basilica to ring the church bell and call the people of the 
Sucre into the streets.73 Heeding the call of the educated lawyer Lemoine, the Sucre 
populations were able to secure Zudáñez release from prison just two hours after he was 
originally detained.  However, more importantly the Sucrense peoples had also called 
into question the colonial regime and had unleashed the ideas of liberty that would soon 
spread throughout South America. 
This minor uprising did not lead to immediate independence, and the Bolivian 
nation would not be formally created until fifteen years later in 1826. However, the Sucre 
elite pointed to this singular event as the origin of the Spanish American independence 
movements. In particular, they glorified the actions of the Sucrense people, who they 
claimed were “naturally proud and restless” and had always been “distinguished by their 
reformist tendencies.”74 According to the Bolivian origin story, Sucrenses were fed up 
with a colonial system that would incarcerate the local lawyer and public defender of the 
poor Zudáñez. Further, Jaime Zudáñez and the fellow doctors and lawyers of Sucre were 
credited with fomenting the campaign to overthrow the Spanish crown. This depiction of 
events claims that the local President of Charcas was really a representation of the 
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Spanish crown, and Zudáñez, Lemoine, and the other Sucre elite actions were a direct 
challenge to the colonial system. This interpretation proposes that the May 25 uprising 
unleashed the ideas of independence in South America, and following the lead of the 
Sucre, Creoles in La Paz, Buenos Aires, and throughout South America began to rise up 
against Spanish Oppression. This place Sucre elite not only as the true fathers of the 
Bolivian nation, but of South American independence in general. According to later 
Chuquisaca elite, this Sucre independence narrative ordained later leaders, and their city, 
with a noble and useable past. 
The Sucre elite’s memory of independence has all the aspects of a fantastic origin 
story. There is an evil member of the royal family in the form of Princess Carlotta, a 
selfless hero in Jaime Zudáñez, and a group of proto-citizens in the masses of Sucre. The 
author even goes to lengths to explain that the proud, restless, and reformist peoples of 
Sucre had a local consciousness that would prefigure an imagined National community. 
According to the author, all that was needed was a sounding of the church bell by the 
esteemed lawyer Lemoine to wake the Americas from their colonial slumber.  
This important alarm clock for Bolivian independence was set up and carried out by the 
elite residents of Sucre. Throughout the narratives, authors place educated Sucre residents 
like Lemoine and Zudáñez as the main characters of the independence epic. It was these 
enlightened lawyers, who led other Bolivians to their political freedom and created the 
Bolivian nation. According to the local Geographic Society, “the generous idea of 
political emancipation was incubated in the minds of the doctors of Chuquisaca. These 
ideas finally sprouted on May 25, 1809, like a flowering of hope.”75 This narration 
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depicted the independence struggle as a top down project originating from the doctors of 
Chuquisaca. Completely absent from these earliest descriptions of the Sucre-center origin 
story are representations of Jose Vicente Camargo or Juana Azurduy. Early on 
Conservatives attempted to use only educated elite like Lemoine and Zudáñez to 
represent their country, so the uneducated and potentially mestizo Camargo and Azurduy 
did not fit into their origin story. Therefore, according to the early Sucre narrations, it was 
the formal meeting of Doctors, including Zudáñez and Lemoine, where the seeds for 
independence and the Bolivian nation began to sprout. 
  This narration of independence memory dovetailed nicely with their political 
platforms for Bolivia’s future. Paternalistic elite from Sucre had helped to break the 
chains of Spanish oppression by encouraging the masses to rise to action, and the 
Conservative Party was going to attempt a similar paternalistic project to re-invigorate 
the Bolivian nation. Since the city of Sucre had a long history of such actions, it seemed 
logical, to the Sucre elite, that the historic city of Sucre was most qualified to lead the 
Bolivian people. The Sucrense elite’s narration of independence memory was designed to 
justify their Conservative nation building project, which suggested the path to a 
successful Bolivian nation was through economic development, land privatization, and 
governmental investments in railroads and telegraph lines. These plans were to be carried 
out by the inheritors of the May 25, 1809 uprising who would once again help to advance 
the Bolivian nation in new, modernizing directions. In this case study, and in numerous 
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others which have been studied by scholars, there are obvious connections between the 
organized displays of public memory and contemporary political projects.76 
It is clear then that the Conservative Party was trying to make a political statement 
in their narration of the Bolivian past. This discourse suggested that Sucre residents had a 
long track record of progressive thought, and that the elite of the region were the most 
qualified to lead the Bolivian nation.  The Sucrense elite’s memory of historical events 
was both shaped by past events like the May 25th uprising and contemporary events, like 
the Liberal Party’s political growth and newly articulated demands for political power. In 
an effort to contest the 1889 Liberal demands to reorganize the Bolivian political sphere, 
Conservatives crafted the Sucre-based, Bolivian origin story to justify the continuation of 
their control of the Bolivian political power.77 Their preferred memory of the origins of 
Bolivian nation both helped to justify their political power and it suggested that under 
Conservative tutelage the Bolivian nation could imagine a bright future.  
While it is challenging to ascertain the level to which this discourse resonated 
with the Bolivian people, this preferred narration of Bolivian history was espoused to a 
broader audience in the years leading up to the war. Sucre was the capital of Bolivia and 
this discourse was the dominant national narrative in the years before the Federal 
Revolution of 1899. In addition to the publications in Sucre, other works were published 
which supported the Sucre origin story in neighboring towns of Cochabamba and Potosi, 
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both located in the valley region.78 Further, there are references in the city newspapers of 
Sucre to celebrations of the eighty-ninth anniversary of May 25th. According to the 
report, “this glorious day has been celebrated with the excitement and enthusiasm by all 
the social classes of the city.”79 These sources only hint at the interpretation of the 
illiterate classes of Sucre, but illiterate members of the Bolivian nation were at least 
exposed to public celebrations of these events. Further, during this period illiterate 
Sucrenses would have seen the “sites of memory” such as the new governmental palace 
and the Gran Mariscal Theater that were mentioned in the previous chapter.80 The 
concept of “sites of memory” suggests that the elite actively try to influence memory of 
people through public works. These sites of embodied memories alter the concept of 
memories according to scholars.81 So, the Sucre centered political and historical 
discourse was being disseminated through a number of mediums during the epoch, and 
non-elite were similarly exposed to the Conservative political project.  
However, a more detailed analysis can be made on the reception of these 
discourses by elite from other cities in the valley region. It appears as though the elite in 
Potosi embraced the Sucre Conservatives’ Bolivian origin story in the waning years of 
the nineteenth century. In 1893, the Centro de Estudios of Potosi published celebratory 
poems, biographies, and short essays about the people of Chuquisaca and their 
contributions to Bolivian independence. In this self-labeled “Literary Soiree,” one 
contributor wrote “Honor to the cultured city of the 25 of May! Give thanks and love to 
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the intellectual center of Bolivia, the cradle of liberty”82 This celebratory feel runs 
throughout this publication and in the concluding poem, written by N.D Morales, the 
Potosi residents express their thanks directly to the city of Sucre. 
 Throughout this poem, the excellence and greatness of the city of Sucre is 
celebrated in a highly artistic manner. The poem is designed as an offer of thanks to the 
city of Sucre, and throughout the stanzas there are numerous references to the greatness 
of Sucre and the ways the Sucre elite gave rise to the Bolivian nation. The author credits 
Sucre with being the “only teacher that awoke the intelligence of Bolivia.”83 Further, 
Morales claims that heroes and geniuses left the city of Sucre to ennoble the historical 
fatherland.84 This representation of Sucre is in line with the Conservative elite’s nation 
building project. Potosi intellectuals represented themselves as the faithful brothers of 
Sucre, and they concurred with this telling of Bolivian history. The agreement between 
Potosi and Sucre aligns with the interpretation that Bolivia has traditionally united along 
regional axes throughout their history, with Potosi and Sucre forming one of the most 
long standing regional alliances.85 However, this example shows that the Sucre origin 
story of Bolivia resonated with at least some other members of the valley regions of 
Bolivia. 
 The elite of Sucre did not just restrict their discourse to the events of May 25, 
1809. The Sucre elite added on to this emblematic memory and included the actions of 
other local independence figures as their control of the Bolivian political sphere lessened. 
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Following the Liberal calls to transition the capital and the near loss of the 1892 
presidential election, Conservatives in Sucre began to incorporate non-Sucre residents 
into their Bolivian origin story. Since the Bolivian independence struggle lasted over 
fifteen years, there were numerous heroic exploits by valley residents that could become 
valuable memories for the Sucrense elite to add to their discourse. As conflict began to 
become more open between La Paz and Sucre, the Conservative elite started to include 
other figures like Juana Azurduy and Jose Vicente Camargo into their Bolivian origin 
story. These figures did not fit the standard profile of the ideal Chuquisaca independence 
war figure. The gender of Juana Azurduy and the questionable racial background of 
Camargo posed problems for the literate elite of Sucre’s political project, but they needed 
other historical figures to emphasize the glory of their region. As Liberal power grew, 
Conservatives needed to attract a larger support base to back their political project. As a 
result, Azurduy and Camargo were included into the canon of independence heroes; 
however, Sucre elite went to great lengths to explain away a number of their physical and 
cultural characteristics. These two figures were known to be mestizos, and had a number 
of indigenous traits in their personal stories. This directly contradicted the Sucre elite’s 
desired narration of Bolivian history, but the tense political climate pushed the 
Conservatives to adopt and racially redeem these independence heroes. 
 In need of more cultural images to support their Bolivian origin story following 
the demands by the Liberal Party, the Sucre elite turned to the figure of Jose Vicente 
Camargo to narrate their nation building project. In the city of Sucre in 1895, Carlos V. 
Romero published a short biography of this “anonymous hero” of the independence 
struggle.  Romero states that his goal in producing this short biography was to introduce 
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the heroics of Camargo to the general public of Bolivia.86 While this choice seems in line 
with the other heroic figures in the Sucre discourse, Camargo is an odd choice to 
venerate. Camargo was not born in Chuquisaca but in the city of Chayanta in the 
neighboring Department of Potosi. To complicate matters further, this region is known 
for its large indigenous populations and its persistent culture of communal autonomy.87 
However, Camargo seems to have become an adopted Chuquisaqueno for the purposes of 
ennobling the history of the Bolivian capital and the department of Chuquisaca. A small 
town was even named after him in the early years of the republic, and Sucre elite relied 
on his story to narrate their goals for the future of Bolivia. 
 In order to make Camargo a suitable figure for veneration, the Sucre elite first had 
to clarify some aspects of his personal background. Due to his birthplace, some historians 
of the time period believed Camargo “was a rich Indian” with large tracts of land, whose 
success in the independence struggles was the result of his ability to recruit fellow 
indigenous men to the military cause.88 Further, some argued that Camargo was a native 
Quechua language speaker. However, according to Romero and other Sucre writers none 
of this was true. Through their telling, “Camargo was not an Indian, nor was he an owner 
of large or small tracts of land. He had virtues and attributes which gave him his own 
value, an intrinsic importance. These values constituted his true personality.”89  Instead of 
attributing Camargo’s success to his indigenous heritage, Romero and other Sucrense 
elite claimed that Camargo’s success was due to his own physical and intellectual 
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attributes. These positive attributes were not a consequence of his indigenous heritage, 
but of his European characteristics and his enlightened ideas. 
 In this era of eugenics and scientific racism, Camargo’s successful attributes were 
associated not with his Indigenous heritage but with his strong moral fortitude, numerous 
virtues, and his European racial characteristics.90 In his physical description of Camargo, 
Romero noted that the independence war leader was “of the Spanish race, with some 
mixture of Quechua blood. He was regular sized, wide shouldered, and well 
proportioned…in the characteristics of his personality, moral and material strength, 
constant energy, determination and valor made him one of the martyrs and obscure 
heroes of Alto-Peru. Sadly, he was sacrificed for the grand cause of the independence of 
South America.”91 This hagiographic description of Camargo emphasizes his European 
heritage over his indigenous background, and it shows the association between physical 
and mental characteristics. Camargo is clearly of the Spanish race due to his good 
proportions, broad shoulders, and strong and expressive gaze. However, it was not just 
these characteristics that made Camargo worth celebrating. According to Romero, 
Camargo’s heroics in the independence war were also a direct result of his great 
leadership abilities. 
 In addition to his European heritage, Romero suggested that Camargo was an 
important and successful independence caudillo because he was very skilled at gaining 
the support of the indigenous masses. Romero claimed that Camargo was “a notable 
public speaker, whose eloquence impassioned his listeners and had particular influence 
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over the indigenous race.”92 The key to Camargo’s public oratory was his vast knowledge 
of Quechua, which he spoke perfectly. Camargo’s understanding of the indigenous 
languages was so vast that he “was familiar with the superstitious beliefs of the Indian; 
their wishes, passions and interests.”93 This knowledge of the indigenous worldview 
allowed Camargo to convince “the Indians….to leave their tranquil lives to which they 
were accustomed, and they enlisted themselves in the lines of the independence 
movements.”94 Through this description of Camargo, Romero is able to explain the 
success of the independence figure by his knowledge, eloquence, and charisma instead of 
his associations with the Indigenous race.  
 Camargo was not an ideal candidate for the Sucre elite to venerate in their 
historical discourses; however, the political climate at the time required Sucre elite to 
make stronger justifications for their continued power. As seen in the previous chapter, 
the La Paz elite were crafting their own narratives about the history of Bolivia.  The 
highland narratives challenged the significance of the May 25 uprising, and they claimed 
that an important component to Bolivian history arose in the Americas and not in 
European ancestry. To combat these new intellectual challenges, and to strengthen their 
claim to political power they chose a figure like Camargo to further show the importance 
of the valley regions in the history of Bolivia. While Camargo might not resemble the 
creole independence figures of Lemoine and Zudáñez, the narrative that Romero told 
about the independence leader is quite familiar. 
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 Through a deconstruction of Romero’s biography, it is clear that he is using 
strategies similar to those employed in the other independence narratives of the epoch. 
Romero tries to show the more European and modern characteristics of Camargo 
throughout his description of the independence hero. Although Camargo is not educated 
in the University of San Francisco Javier in Sucre, the oldest university on the South 
American continent, the author tries to show that the hero is an eloquent and bi-lingual 
speaker who understands the political implications surrounding the independence 
struggle. Further, Camargo fits neatly into the paternalistic model espoused by 
Conservative elite in both their historical texts and their political agenda. These narrative 
descriptions of independence leaders were the common tropes of the era. As seen in the 
Camargo case study, the basic form of the narrative remains the same even when the 
historical character does not fit as neatly into the Sucre elite’s preferred telling of 
history.95 However, Camargo was included to this national discourse in an effort to 
increase support for the Conservative Party. A racially ambiguous mestizo, who notably 
had a great understanding of indigenous culture, would potentially resonate with a much 
broader audience than the Doctors and Lawyers who participated in the May 25th 
uprising. 
 The case study of Juana Azurduy further illustrates the continuities across the 
independence discourses of the Conservative elite; however, the Azurduy case differs in 
important ways from Lemoine, Zudáñez, and Camargo because of her gender. Azurduy is 
a well-studied independence figure and multiple scholars have unveiled her heroic 
                                                           
95 For more discussion on deconstruction and narrative form in historical discourses see: Hayden White, 
The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1990) 
  
42 
actions under the command of Manuel Belgrano in the battles for independence for Alto-
Peru.96 These works have shown that her indigenous language skills and persistent 
personality were key to gaining indigenous support for some of Belgrano’s victories.97 
However, her specific contributions are not elaborated upon in the historical writings of 
the Conservative Sucre elite. 
 In the years leading up to the federal revolution, when Conservative political 
power and the location of the capital came under fire, Conservative elite began to 
recognize Azurduy as a “glorious heroine,” but her memory was still not appropriated as 
one of the primary figures to represent the nation building project of Sucre.98 One of the 
brief mentions of her indicates that her military career started during a battle in Pitantora, 
and that she later distinguished herself during combat at Viluma where she led a 
battalion.99 However, her actions are constantly framed as actions in connection to her 
husband’s, Manual de Padilla, death. By framing her actions as taking up the cause of a 
fallen spouse, Azurduy’s political motives are silenced in these accounts.  In addition to 
this gendered framing, there is no mention of her vital organizing efforts in the build up 
to the important independence battles. Perhaps this rather limited elaboration upon the 
actions of Azurduy is the result of her ill fit into the narrative tropes of the Conservative 
Party. While her actions could easily fit into the model of the Conservative’s discourses 
on independence, the Conservative elite could not imagine a woman serving the role of a 
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patriotic leader for the indigenous majority. As a result of her gender, the elite of Sucre 
chose not to glorify her actions in as much detail in the years leading up to the war. 
However, the Conservative writers did use her historical exploits to discuss race in 
Bolivia. 
 While Azurduy’s gender precluded full inclusion into the historical and political 
discourses of the Conservative elite, the writers did weigh in on her racial status in their 
publications. According to one historian of the era who spent much of his life in the city 
of Sucre, Azurduy was a mestiza, but “in this degree of cross-mixture the Adalucian tint 
predominated over the indigenous coloring.”100 This quote was republished by the Sucre 
city council in their effort to uncover the origins of the independence movements, and it 
marks one of the two references to Azurduy in the entire volume.101 Throughout both of 
these brief descriptions, Azurduy is an inheritor of the legacies of the preceding May 25, 
1809 uprising but it is important for them to justify her racial status. Azurduy was 
appropriated by the Conservative elite in order to increase support for their political 
platforms, and it seems that women gravitated to the Azurduy figure since a women’s 
society chose to name their organization after the independence figure during this era. 
However, Conservative’s concluded that Azurduy could not become the major figure due 
to her gender.  
 These descriptions of Azurduy reveal the Conservative elite’s ambivalent stance 
towards her as a local symbol prior to the Federal Revolution of 1899. Unlike Camargo, 
Azurduy could not serve as a representational figure for the future of Bolivia. Her gender 
and her questionable racial status did not suit the goals of the Conservative Party. 
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However, the Conservatives still made sure to discuss her racial make-up. The 
Conservative’s stance was ambiguous because Azurduy was mestiza and they could not 
entirely contest that fact. Further, a mestiza or a racially ambiguous figure, that might 
resonate with indigenous and mestiza citizens. Sensing this the Conservative Party used 
her memory to serve the political goal of gaining more support for their political project. 
Therefore, the Conservatives acknowledged her mixed race status but emphasized her 
European traits in a similar fashion as their approach to Camargo. However, the 
Conservative elite never explicitly supported a platform of mestizaje similar to those seen 
in other countries in Latin America.102 Throughout their discourses the elite maintained 
an ambiguous stance towards race, except their consistent favoring of creoles or whitened 
mestizos. This allowed them to create a nation narrative that appeared more inclusive, 
while still maintaining their goal of keep political power in the hands of the Conservative 
Sucre elite. 
 When discussing race, Conservatives often acknowledged that Bolivians could 
not easily claim a pure European heritage, and they chose instead to discuss racial 
categories through the ways that peoples adhered to European conceptions of progress. 
Throughout their discourses the elite of Sucre admitted that “Quechua blood might 
circulate in our veins,” but they did not accept European notions that meant that they 
were degenerate because of their indigenous heritage.103 Instead, the Sucre elite 
questioned whether racial categories were even applicable to their region and people. 
Describing the racial makeup of their department a local elite suggested “the predominate 
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races, if different groups of the Bolivian populations can be called races, by comparison 
of their different characteristics between them, they are distinguished some from others. 
These include the White race, the mestizo race, the Quechua race, and the Guarani race. 
The first two races live in urban centers and have a marked tendency to absorb the other 
races. The other two races live in rural areas like Tomina, Cinti, Yamapaez and 
Acero.”104 This stance on race at once reaffirms a racial hierarchy that places whites and 
mestizos above the indigenous, and it reinforces the idea that urban living was a sign of 
progress, while also questioning the validity of strict racial categories. The concept of 
race was still predominate in this era and Sucre elite were trying to negotiate their place 
within the new classification system. As a result, the Sucre elite remained ambiguous on 
their racial project while still emphasizing the virtues and desirability of European 
cultural traits and lighter skin. This response to European racial categories was in effect a 
Sucre version of eugenics, which suggested that indigenous men and women could be 
absorbed or redeemed through a process of paternalistic tutelage and the adoption of a 
modern, urban lifestyle. In this way, indigenous men and women in Bolivia could 
become valuable citizens like their mestizo forbearers Azurduy and Camargo.  
 Through the historical symbols of Lemoine, Zudáñez, Azurduy, and Camargo the 
Conservative elite of Sucre were able to provide a justification for the glorious heritage 
for their region and their capital city. Grafted onto these glorifying narratives were echoes 
of their party’s political project and their intentions for the Bolivia’s future. Through 
these historical figures, the Conservatives were able to propose their political agenda and 
to take important public stances on the “Indian question” of the time period.  
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 Their discourses were often ambiguous on the exact racial status of their region, 
but they were never vague on who should lead the Bolivian nation. While giving 
extended explanations for indigenous blood, the Conservatives never endorsed a plan of 
mestizaje or a redemption project for a downtrodden but previously prestigious 
indigenous populous. Instead, Conservatives in Sucre attached their vision of Bolivia’s 
future to their city’s heroic actions in the independence wars against Spain. This public 
discourse allowed the Conservatives in Sucre to justify their political power and to 
contest the political maneuvering of the Liberals from the highlands. Furthermore, it 
legitimized the city of Sucre as capital of the Bolivian nation and claimed that it should 
continue in this role due to its long history of patriotic leadership. 
Although this telling of Bolivian history might seem to have little resonance with a 
country that is made up a majority of indigenous groups and a region were mestizos and 
indigenous citizens were prevalent, residents of Sucre took up arms in the 1899 Federal 
Revolution to support their region and the Conservative Party’s political project. 
Although the war ended after only a few months, the wounds to the regions’ prestige 
would not heal immediately. The loss of the seat of government and the forfeiture of 
political power enraged Sucre residents. So even though the nation officially reconciled 
after the conflict, following the war Sucre residents retained a sense of superiority based 
on the Conservative elite’s depictions of their glorified past.
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CHAPTER4 
“SOY SUCRENSE’: A RECONCILIATION OR AN UNEASY PEACE? 
 In December of 1898, crowds of Sucre residents gathered in the city streets to 
give a celebratory sendoff for the local Conservative troops. The young soldiers were 
marching out to contest the growing uprising in the highland regions and to reunite a 
Bolivia being torn apart by regional interests. It was a festive atmosphere for the Sucre 
residents and the soldiers of the “25 de Mayo” and “Sucre” squadrons. According to the 
later recollections of one Sucre resident, there was even the sound of music ringing in 
Sucre as “the youth of Chuquisaca, after an emotional sendoff given by the city of Sucre, 
exited the city happy and confident, singing local anthems in Quechua and Spanish, as is 
the custom in the town.”105 Confident and supportive of the Conservatives’ nation 
building project that emphasized the greatness of their city, the young soldiers of 
Chuquisaca had little idea that many of them would never see their hometown again.
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A few months after this festive sendoff, the soldiers from Chuquisaca were 
defeated in the short but bloody Federal Revolution, which ushered the Bolivian nation 
into a new era. After the Liberal military forces and the Aymara troops of Pablo “Zarate” 
Willka defeated the  Conservative troops, the Liberal Party inherited a tense cultural 
atmophere and a fractured national body .106 Following the war, the Liberal Party was 
faced with the challenge of reincorporating the region of Chuquisaca into the national 
framework. The traditional historical interpretation of the post Federal Revolution era in 
Chuquisaca suggests that the Conservatives and Liberals reconciled over their shared fear 
of a race war and together they villianized the Aymara for their participation in the 
Federal Revolution.107 This supposed agreement allowed the two political parties to 
reconcile quickly after the war and continue the proposed modernizing agendas of the 
Bolivian elite; however, the extent of this reconciliation has been vastly overstated by 
scholarship.108  
 While the elite of the two regions concurred on the status of Aymara groups at the 
bottom of Bolivia’s social heirarchy, the reconcilation process was not an “elite 
consenus.”109 The Federal Revolution left Chuquisaca residents with both physical and 
emotional scars that were not easily forgiven. As a result of these contentious feelings, 
the new Liberal Party leaders from the Highland region accepted a partial reconiliation 
with the conquered people of the Chuquisaca region and the Conservative Party. In order 
to achieve a degree of political stability and a functional national environment, the 
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Liberal Party tacitly allowed for Chuquisaca’s local cultural practices to continue in 
return for a peaceful political reconcilation. 
  As a result, the city of Sucre was able to maintain their Sucre-centered narration 
of Bolivian history in the years following the Federal Revolution, and it began to shift 
slightly to focus more on the return of the capital to its rightful location. Sucre writers 
continued to use independence memory to assert Sucrense exceptionalism within the 
Bolivian nation, and these memories became a key source for demanding the return of the 
capital to Sucre. In their efforts to achieve political reconiliation, the Liberal Party even 
helped to fund some of these memory discourses, as seen in the public monuments 
constructed in the decade after 1899. However, this lax approach to Sucrense cultural 
projects had unintended consequences and helped to foster a long running reigonal rivalry 
that remains very much alive in modern Sucre. 
 As the opening vignette of this chapter suggests, the residents of Sucre were 
confident and proud as the conflict quickly escalted to full blown Civil war. In an already 
tense national atmosphere, a series of political debates, culminated by a November 
congressional motion to again move the seat of government to La Paz, pushed the 
Chuquisaca region into battle with the highland regions in 1898. The November 
legislation did not sit well with Sucre residents, who had been exposed to ten years of 
public discourse designed to defend the capital’s continuation in the city of Sucre. One 
newspaper report accurately shows how citizens repurposed the Conservative Party’s 
political tropes in a letter to the editor. This enraged Sucre citizen passionately wrote “it 
is not just, nor patriotic, to want to take the glorious title of capital of the republic from 
Sucre, that was conferred to the city by the Congresses of 1825, 1826, 1839, and 1843, 
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which were composed up of the most honorable and presigious people that the nation has 
seen.”110 This instance clearly shows the impact that the Conservative Party’s public 
discourses had on the literate elite of Sucre, and it helps to explain the eagerness with 
which the residents went to war for the Conservative cause. Conservative discourse truly 
resonated with the residents of Sucre, and they felt that their region was home to the most 
honorable and presitigous people in the Bolivian nation. Sucre was exceptional in 
Bolivia, and the new elite of La Paz could never be as well suited to run the National 
government. 
 The Conservative Party’s public discourse was truly powerful as it created broad 
suppport for Sucre in the capitalia debate and shaped Sucre residents’ personal identities. 
Sucre residents truly took the Conservative Party’s discourse to heart, and they embraced 
the narrative of their city’s past. During this era, one newspaper started to “suggest the 
adoption of the phrase ‘I am Sucrense.’”111 According to this publication, the phrase “I 
am Sucrense” would help to signify  the positive aspects of the city and it’s residents. 
These traits of Sucre include the “culture, tolernece, and illustration, in short the very 
essence of what it meant to be Chuquisacaqueno”.112 These chararcteristics” which are 
associated with being born in Sucre and allow her residents to be esteemed in whatever 
part of the world.”113 As this letter to the editor shows, this Sucre resident endorsed and 
reappropriated the Conservative Party’s political and historical discourses. The unnamed 
journalist noted that being Sucrense earned the bearer of the title a privledged status no 
matter where the Sucre resident traveled. Being from Sucre was an important component 
                                                           
110 El Eco de Los Libres, November 18, 1898. Padilla, Bolivia, P.1, ABNB #290 
111 “Soy Sucrense” El Buen Sentido, Sucre, January 11, 1899 ABNB 
112 The actual translation is “no se que” 
113 IBID p. 2 
 51 
to their Sucre residents’ identity and it had important cultural currency to be able to claim 
this Sucrense background. Further, this elite status helped to justify their demand for the 
full seat of government. The Conservative discourse had attached their citizens presitige 
to the demand that Sucrenses were the most qualified to lead the Bolivian nation. 
However, this title and status were also worth fighting for if the town felt 
disrespected. As the writer stated, “I am a Sucrense and because of this I am going to 
combat for the country in which I was born and saw the first light of day. Another city, 
full of pride, has provoked me into a mortal fight. I am a Sucrense, which is to say, I was 
born in the capital of Bolivia and for this I am going to fight against the ferocious 
Pacenos, who want to take the Capital by force and without more cause than their own 
audacity.”114 This Sucrense relied heavily on the same tropes as the Conservative Party’s 
public discourse and he chose to fight for his city and the Conservative Party’s legitimate 
role defined by the city’s role as capital of Bolivia. . In his view, “Sucrenses” were 
exceptional for their positive characteristics, glorious independence history, and “their 
essence,” and it was unpatriotic for highland residents to audaciously challenge Bolivia’s 
aristocratic Sucre residents by attempting to take the capital away from its righful home. 
 Numerous other residents of Chuquisaca felt that the Conservative cause was 
something important enough to fight for. People of disparate classes rallied around the 
Conservative Party. A wider support base was necessary in a war against the highland 
region with a larger population of largely dissatisifed Bolivians. However, the 
Conservatives did gain a broad support base and soldiers of different classes appear to 
have participated in the conflict. According to one newspaper, a squadron of students and 
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a squardon of “distinguished artisans” left the city “to fight in defense of the nation, for 
the union of Bolivia and for the capital.”115 This brief reference indicates that there was a 
class or racial division between these two squadrons, since the newpaper reporter clearly 
notes a differentiation between the two groups. However, the writer is careful not to 
assign racial or ethnic markers to the soldiers. Even in the cases where it was noted that 
the soldiers sang in quichua, the author refers to the soldiers as the “youth of Chuquisaca” 
instead of using overt racial markers. This reflects the continued efforts to try to remain 
ambigious on racial categories of their region, and their ultimate goal of creating a united 
front around the practice of defending the capital.116 
Further, there is some evidence to suggest the Sucre specific independence 
disource was so compelling that members of the Liberal Party chose to fight with the 
Conservatives in order to support their region. As a Liberal newpaper in Sucre claimed, 
“in all the youth that have marched to battle from the city of Sucre, it can be calculated 
that more than fifty percent were members of the Liberal Party.”117 While the newspaper 
strongly supported the Liberal Party’s political platform, the writer suggests that the 
Conservative’s Sucre centered discourse convinced some young Liberals to fight for their 
city instead of for their political party.118 This publication even suggested that the war 
“became rapidly regional.”119 These regional alliances overcame political divisions to 
such an extent that a few historians have labeled the Federal Revolution the War between 
La Paz and Chuquisaca.120 While the newspaper was obviously overstating this claim, it 
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does show that the entire city of Sucre was enthralled by the demand to keep the capital 
and many honestly believed they had a right to retain political power for their region. At 
the least, Liberal elite in Sucre had to publish accounts which suggested that their party 
would fight for their town over their political ideologies whether this was accurate on not. 
Despite the confidence and widespread support of Sucre residents, the war effort ended 
disastorously for the Conservative forces. The cross party and cross class military 
coalition supporting the Conservative Party and the city of Sucre was unable to contend 
with the Liberal armies during the early months of 1899. As multiple scholars have 
recounted, the Liberal military forces of General Pando and his vital alliance with the 
Aymara forces led by Pablo “Zarate” Willka, the principal Aymara community leader 
involved in the 1899 Federal Revolution, outmanuevered and overwhelmed President 
Alonso’s Conservative troops.121 The conflict which lasted from December 1898 to April 
1899 culminated in a number of highly publicized and bloody massacres. 
As word of these military defeats reached the city in February and March of 1899, 
Sucre residents reacted emotionally. The Sucre newspapers of the era depicted the 
Conservative defeats in a  tragic light that emphasized the unjustified victimization of 
Chuquisaca youth at the hands of savage highland residents. In particular, the writers 
emphasized the greatness and artistocratic nature of the Chuquisaca youth, in order to 
reinforce the Conservatives claim that Sucre was the legitimate and only justified 
political center of the Bolivian nation. The discourse depicted Chuquisaca’s youth 
sacrificing themselves for a just cause, and a barbarous enemy from the highlands that 
wanted to unjustifiably usurp political power.  Narrating the military massacres of the 
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Conservative forces, one Sucre writer described the Conservative troops as “our noble 
sons, the greatest of the youth, the aristocracy of the society, the aristocracy of talent, that 
is also the aristocracy of valor, has been put to the test and has received a baptism of 
blood.”122 Further, the writers continue to compare the Chuquisaca youth to Europeans. 
This was a strategy to endow the Chuquisaca residents with a claim to status that adheres 
to the theories of scientific racism that supported whiteness, European modernity, and 
progress. The journalists depictions relied on famous European mythology and history to 
talk about the battles in Bolivia. Therefore writers noted that Chuquisaca residents, “they 
have fought like the Spartans of Leonidas, they have given themselve to the sacrifice and 
it is sad to say they have been victimized.”123 This discursive strategy endowed all Sucre 
residents with this a percieved exceptionalism and reveals the continuation of their 
defense of Sucre as the rightful capital of Bolivia.  
This narrative trope of unwarranted victimization was made all the more powerful 
when it was juxtiposed with very different descriptions of the Liberal troops. While 
Conservative forces were portrayed as groups of innocent youths, the Liberal forces were 
characterized by their ferocity and barberism. Throughout the published reports in Sucre, 
the Conservatives forces were contending with “the ferorcious people from La Paz.”124 
According to the descriptions, their ferorcity came from the large number of Aymara 
troops and their the general lack of civilization. Therefore, the innoncent youths of 
Chuquisaca were suddenly put into a fight to the death between vastly different peoples. 
According to one Sucre newspaper report, “the war was between a barborous element and 
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an element of civilization. These barborous people cannot overcome their origen and 
their race. They may feign manners of civilization but their ferocious instincts always 
arise due to their racial background.”125 This vicious fight to the death did not end well 
for the “civilized element” of the Bolivian nation as the Conservative forces were 
massacred by the “indigenous tribes that continue vigorously conducting violence in the 
street and each day more mostrousous victimizations are commited by this race.”126 As 
these depictions reveal, the war actually intensified the number of publications that 
emphasized the greatness and exceptionalism of Sucre residents. This intensification of 
the discourse depicted La Paz residents in a racialized and inferior light in order to 
continue their argument that the highland region did not have a justifiable claim to 
political power or the capital’s location. 
These depictions continued to represent Sucre as the enlightened and progressive 
region of Bolivia, while painting the highland region as the indigenous and monstruous 
rival. In effect, this discourse was designed to aruge that the center of government did not 
belong in the highland region. Sucre was the cultural and historical center of the Bolivian 
nation; therefore, they had the only legitimate right to political power. The Conservative 
Party’s political platforms before the war had a strong resonance with the citizens of 
Sucre who were willing to fight for their city and their supposed claim to Sucrense status. 
As the war effort began to fail and military defeats accumulated, the Conservatives 
officially conceded defeat in April of 1899 and Sucre residents were left to make sense of 
their numerous loses. While the citizens of Sucre may have experienced a blow to their 
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prestige, their public writings continued to emphasize similar disursive tropes about their 
enlightened city. 
Following their bloody defeats, the citizens of Sucre were not eager to reconcile 
with their opponents from La Paz. However, the war had caused massive changes in the 
Bolivian political sphere, and the military defeats harmed the prestige of general 
Sucrense residents. The residents had embraced the invented traditions claiming Sucre 
exceptionalism, but this imagined exceptionalism had not helped them in the military 
campaign. Now the Liberals held political power, and the highlands were now home to 
the economic and political cores of the Bolivian nation. Despite their formal military 
surrender, the residents of Sucre and the Conservative Party had not completely 
abandoned their political goals. In the years following the war, Sucre residents continued 
to espouse militaristic threats and propoganda celebrating their city’s greatness through 
their independence past. 
As their military losses mounted, Conservatives started to realize that oligarchic 
control of Bolivian politics was coming to an end and they began debating their future 
options. Conservative leaders knew the Liberals’ victory would usher in a new era for the 
Bolivian nation and they were particuraly concerned with the debates over the Nation’s 
new system of government and the location of the capital. The Liberal Party had 
demanded a federalist governmental system in the years leading up to the Civil war in 
reaction to the opulent spending in Sucre and the valley regions. In the months following 
the war, these questions would be resolved in a national convention. 
Sucre residents were strongly against the federalist system proposed by La Paz residents, 
and they desired the continuation of a centralized state government based out of Sucre. 
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Conservatives worried that  La Paz residents would take advantage of their military 
victory during the national convention and craft legislation to suit their “local passions 
and demands.”127 In particular, they worried that the Liberals would “impose on the 
Bolivian nation, a form of government contrary to the one that has ruled the country, 
since it was founded and constituted by the inmortal liberators Bolivar and Sucre.”128 
Once again, this contestation of Liberal Party advances relies on claims to independence 
figures like Bolivar and Sucre to contest changes in the Bolivian politics. The writer 
claims that the Liberals are trying to impose an incorrect form of government on a 
Bolivian nation that was founded by enlightened leaders who had chosen the city of 
Sucre to lead a centralized Bolivian nation. Their historically grounded claim to 
governmental control was established by historical memory of the founding fathers, and 
the new highland elite did not have a right to make these changes to the Bolivian nation. 
As these proposals became more likely, Sucre residents started to question what steps 
their region should take in the event that Liberals moved the capital to La Paz and 
instituted a Federalist system. While there was certainly talk of tacit acceptance, there 
were also calls for seperation from the Bolivian nation. Taking the capital debate as their 
last symbolic claim to political power, a Sucre newspaper claimed “La Paz wants to be 
capital of Bolivia, and…never will it be the capital. We would prefer to annex our region 
to another Nation.”129 While this threat may have been made in the heat of a tense 
political moment, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that this was a real possibility. La 
Paz residents were highly concerned with the threats and took great strides to ease 
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tensions in the aftermath of the war in order to avoid a fragmentation of the Bolivian 
nation.  
The Liberals realized that the reconstruction of Bolivia would be challenging 
following the bloody civil war, and they crafted a policy that allowed for the best 
reconcilation possible. The new Liberal government understood that Sucre residents were 
enraged by their loss of family members, political power, and local presige during the 
Federal Revolution. Furthermore, the Liberals realized the powerful Conservative 
discourse involving Sucrense history that the party had attached their platform. Liberals 
saw this propoganda as false and tried to tactfully undermine it by refuting the 
Conservative Party’s claims to the capital. In particular, the Liberals attempted to claim 
the only reason the capital debate had even arisen was due to the Conservative Party’s 
poor leadership. In a Liberal leaning newspaper of Sucre, a writer claimed that the 
Conservative Party had misrepresented the debate over the right to house the capital in 
order to maintain their political power. According to this writer, “that which seems most 
incredible, is that the Conservatives want to take the Capitalia question as their talking 
point, with the most absolute lack of logic and with malicious misrepresentation of past 
events. The only ones that have comprised the capital for the city of Sucre…are the 
Conservatives.”130 The Liberals understood that the debate held powerful sway over the 
residents of Sucre, and they tried to seperate the Conservative Party’s political cause from 
the debate over the captial’s location. The Liberals suggested that the Conservative led 
central government was incompetent, and they argued that the new economic elite of the 
highlands were better suited to run the country under a federalist system. However, this 
                                                           
130 Boletin de Variedades April 28, 1899 no.2 PBCH 295 ABNB 
 59 
was not entirely convincing to the residents of Sucre who continued to associate the 
Liberal Party with highland residents’ claims for political power. 
The  Liberal political leaders realized the only way to ensure a workable national 
reconciliation was to allow for some political and cultural concessions. Following the 
war, the Liberal Party transitioned the seat of government to La Paz but allowed the city 
of Sucre to retain the title of Capital and the judicial branch of government. The debate 
over the capital was too contentious for the Liberal Party to just transfer the capital to La 
Paz, so they allowed the city of Sucre to retain the nominal title. Throughout their 
published documents, the Liberal Party still refered to Sucre as the capital of the Bolivian 
nation. In their important National Census of 1900, which represented the party’s newly 
gained control over the Bolivian nation, the Liberal leaders even acknowledged the 
congressional acts of early governments that named Sucre the capital of Bolivia.131 
Furthermore, they allowed the Sucre residents to continue using the Capital title for their 
city. Throughout the published documents in the years following 1899, Sucre residents 
noted that their city was the capital of Bolivia. This includes the 1903 Geographic 
dictionary of Sucre, which listed its publication location as “Sucre, Capital of the 
Republic.”132 As these examples show, the Liberal Party decided that allowing some 
concessions was better than risking the annexation of part of the Bolivian nation. 
However, the Liberal Party was forced to make more long lasting cultural concessions to 
ensure peace in the aftermath of the war despite their superficial efforts to enforce 
National unity.  
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The Liberal Party took a number of other steps to ensure the reconiliation between 
the two regions including sending good will ambassadors to the region. In 1902, the 
Archbishop of La Paz, Nicolas Armentia came to Sucre on a peace keeping mission. 
According to newspaper reports of the visit, the Archbishop “brought words of peace to 
Sucre” and tried to foster brotherhood between “two children of the same mother.”133 The 
Archbishop emphasized the similarities between the two regions and chastized the 
citizens of Sucre for their “recent passions” that had prevented the peace talks between 
the two regions.134 It seems as though the words of the Archbishop also did not resonate 
with the people of Sucre, since the following year the Liberal Party attempted to enact 
legislation asserting National control over the civic holidays in  Bolivia.  
This 1903 congressional legislation made August 6th, the day that the Bolivian 
nation was officially founded, the only legal civic holiday in the Bolivian nation.135 
Further, the legislation explicitly noted that other “municipalities are not authorized to 
declare holidays.”136 Considering the tense national atmosphere and the symbolic 
importance of the May 25th uprising for the Conservatives in Sucre, it seems likely that 
this piece of legislation was intended to both extend the power of the Liberal Party’s 
government and also intended to put a stop to some of the Sucre residents regionally 
specific celebrations. However, this piece of legislation was enacted in name only and 
scholars have noted that the edict was not enforced with much regularity in the early 
twentieth century.137 Therefore, on surface-level this law appears to be an attempt to 
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enforce a shared, invented tradition, but in practice the regional celebration of May 25th 
continued to live on in Sucre.  
If there were efforts to enforce this legislation, they do not seem to have had much 
impact in the city of Sucre where celebrations of the May 25th uprising and local 
independence figures continued unabated following the Federal Revolution. In the years 
following the war, the Conservative discourse about the origin of the Bolivian nation was 
revived by a number of local intellectual societies in the city of Sucre.These societies 
included the Geographical Society of Sucre and the Society Monteagudo, which was 
named after one of the Bolivian independence leaders. The latter society even published 
advertisements in papers discussing their group’s mission and activities. One add 
suggested the Society Monteagudo was a “patriotic association that has been organized 
with the objective to conmemorate the great festivities of May 25,” and they intended to 
use the party’s periodical, which was called El Sucrense, to accomplish this mission.138 
The continuation of the May 25th celebration shows that the two regions were still at odds 
on a number of important issues. Both of these local patriotic societies continued to 
espouse discourses which celebrated their region instead of the national government. 
Sucre was still the intellectual, cultural, and historical capital of the Bolivian nation, and 
they argued that it should also be the political capital of the republic. While the two 
regions may have worked together politically, they were still at odds and repeatedly came 
to blows in intellectual and cultural debates. 
Notably, The two regions disagreed greatly on the findings of the 1900 Census 
that was carried out by the new Liberal government. According to the writers of the 
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geographic dictionary written by the Geographical Society of Sucre, the Liberal Party’s 
census had “data that was indoubtably far from exact” because “the project which was 
carried out was not a true census.”139 The Geographical Society of Sucre called into 
question the legitimacy and objectivity of the Census takers and echoed ideas that La Paz 
residents were not the best qualified to conduct governmental task. Instead the writer 
suggested that a local census conducted under Conservative supervision in 1897 was “the 
closest to the truth.”140 Importantly, this 1897 census had found that “the indigenous 
element was negligible in the city of Sucre.”141 While a disagreemeent over census data 
may appear minor, it reflects the widespread conflict between the two regions and it 
shows the resiliance of the Conservative nation building discourse. The elite of Sucre and 
La Paz could not even agree on the data of a census, and the ill feelings from the 1899 
conflict no doubt played a role in this debate. It also clearly shows that Sucre elite 
critiqued the La Paz centered government by stating that they had not even conducted a 
census properly.  Further, Sucrense elite used this conflict to suggest that they were more 
qualified to lead governmental tasks. Throughout this critique they continued to 
emphasize that their city was exceptional and that it had almost no indigenous residents. 
While the elite of Sucre may have given up the war cause, they had not abadoned their 
mission to reclaim political power in Bolivia. 
The Geographical Society of Sucre played an important role in this project to 
reclaim political power. The elite in this society produced numerous publications in order 
to foster the independence memories of their region and to reclaim the respect that they 
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had lost in the war. This Society regularly published journals on the geography, history, 
and culture of the department of Chuquisaca. Included in these works are dictionaries, 
local censuses, and history lessons often noting the actions of the region during the 
independence struggles. In the society’s 1903 dictionary, the writers discussed the make 
up of their region and defined the cities, geographical landmarks, and the regions 
residents. In numerous definitions, the authors added historical facts about the role the 
region played in the independence battles against Spain. In their definition of the city of 
Sucre they clearly indicated the city’s glorious independence past by stating “in the 
expressed city the first cry of independence was shout, on May 25, 1809, constituting this 
date the war of 17 years, that emanipated South america from Spanish tuteledge.”142 
Furthermore, these elite continued to emphasize the centrality of the department of 
Chuquisaca in other independence exploits. Just as elite had before the war, the post 1899 
writers used the exploits of Jose Vicente Camargo and Juana Azurduy to discuss the 
greatness of their region.143 Despite official efforts to curb these regional invented 
traditions, the Geographical Society of Sucre continued to serve the important role of 
narrating the Sucre regions prefered history of Bolivia. This society, which was made up 
of the educated elite of Sucre, was led by Jose Valentin Abecia Ayllon. Abecia was a 
prominent doctor and professor in Sucre, and constantly led the Geographic Society in 
espousing the regions rich history.  
After serving the role of dissemenating local history unofficially since 1893, the 
men of the Geographic Society of Sucre were given the official task of commemorating 
Sucre’s independence memory on the one hundreth anniversary of May 25, 1809. These 
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men were asked to be in charge of “the commemoration of the Centennial of the grandest 
event of South American history: May 25, 1809.”144 As scholars have noted, major 
anniversies often intensify the political stakes for memories, and the one century 
celebration of May twenty fifth uprising in Sucre certainly confers this claim.145 The one 
hundreth anniversary was an opportunity for Sucrense elite to discuss the greatness of 
their region despite their recent defeat at the hands of the highland region in the Federal 
Revolution. To do this the elite from Sucre relied on the same figures from the pre-war 
era including Juana Azurduy, Lemoine, and Zudanez. The proposed celebration put the 
Liberal Party in a delicate predicament, and they chose not to enforce their legislation and  
they supported the Sucre celebrations. 
There were a wealth of publications commemorating the one hundreth 
anniversary all of which continued to emphasize the exceptionalism of the city of Sucre. 
Elite from Sucre produced numerous publications that espoused the similar tropes of the 
Sucre origin story and an imagined Sucre cultural hearth. There were works recounting 
the biographies of Jose Joaquin de Lemoine and other independence leaders.146 
Furthermore, an elite women’s society, The Juana Azurduy de Padilla patriotic society of 
Women, published a short volume that emphasized the actions of Chuquisaca women 
during the independence struggles.147 The volume described women’s actions in the 
independence struggle throughout Bolivia.. However, the most glowing descriptions were 
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reserved for the women of Chuquisaca and in particular Juana Azurduy de Padilla. The 
authors described Azurduy as an “exceptional heroine” who was motived by “the idea of 
liberty” to leave the domestic life and serve the country.148 The descriptions of Juana 
Azurduy de Padilla follow the basic contours of the Conservative Party discourses and 
the publications was intended in part to emphasize the greatness of Chuquisaca and 
Sucre. However, the women’s society also used this publication to emphasize their 
feminist ideas. This shows that while elite discourse may have a restricted goal, the 
discourses can be manipulated and changed due to intertextual interpretation. In this case, 
women’s rights can be linked to the historically dominant independence discourse in 
Sucre. 
While these publications show the widespread celebration of the one hundreth 
anniversery, the most important commemoration project was the construction of a series 
of statues in Sucre’s main plaza. Following the direction of the original legislation of 
Bolivia’s early congresses, the Sucre elite decided to construct a statue of Jose Antonio 
de Sucre in the center of the city. This statue would be sorrunded by the statues of 
Bernardo Monteguedo and Jaime Zudanez, two other independence figures who played 
prominent roles in the May 25, 1809 uprising, to completely remake the city center of 
Sucre. The decision to follow through on the pre-1899 plans to construct this statue 
reveals that the Sucrense cultural project was still alive and thriving despite the loss in the 
Federal Revolution. In large mesure, this was possible because the Liberal Party needed 
to make some concessions in order to ensure the peaceful reconstruction of Bolivia. 
When the statue of Jose Antonio de Sucre was christened on the one hundreth anniversy 
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of the May 25, 1809 uprising, La Paz sent a plaque to show their support and to try to 
gain the favor of Sucre resident to ensure continued peace. Revealing its true purpose and 
the tense atmosphere of the era the plaque represented the two cities in the form of 
women holding their respective city’s coat of arms. The plaque showed the La Paz 
symbol extending an olive branch to the symbol of Sucre in an act of peace 
Following the war, Sucre residents continued to hold very negative opinions of 
the Liberal Party and the highland region. Sucre residents were not eager to reconcile and 
still held strong memories of military conflict. In a graphic example, one Sucre resident 
stated his feelings about La Paz residents bluntly in a letter to the editor to the weekly 
paper El Buen Sentido. His letter suggested the emotional scars of war were far from 
resolved because “when I see a Paceno walking very confidently in Sucre, they say a 
person of high character for his illustration and the high  social position that he occupies, 
I have the desire to break my cane over his head, but I contain myself because I am a 
Sucrense.”149 These were the types of problems the newly empowered Liberal Party 
faced. Sucre residents were not eager to reconcile in the aftermath of the bloody war, and 
despite the general interpretation of subsequent scholarship an “elite consensus” could 
not erase all the bad feelings between the two regions. 
In order to create a workable national environment, the Liberals extended an olive 
branch to the city of Sucre and allowed the region a degree of cultural autonomy in the 
aftermath of the war. The Liberal Party actively sought a full reconciliation through the 
villianization of the Aymaras, but this did not resolve all the two regions differences. 
Therefore, the Liberals allowed the city to maintain the title of capital, and they did not 
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enforce legislation banning the celebration of regional holidays. Instead, the Liberals in 
power actually supported the celebration of Sucre’s prefered history of Bolivia on the 
100th anniverary of the May 25, 1809 uprising. These concessions allowed the Liberal 
Party to create a functional national environment in which they could try to move the 
nation forward. Unfortunately, these concession and especially the Sucre discourse of 
Bolivian history had unforeseen consequences. These unresolved regional conflicts rose 
to the surface a century later, and this time Sucre residents were not able to contain 
themselves. In the twenty first century, Sucre resident carried out the physical assaults 
that the former Sucrense elite cotemplated following the Federal Revolutio
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CHAPTER 5 
INDEPENDENCE MEMORY AND RACIAM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
 A little over a century after the Sucrense writer contained his violent urges to hit a 
confident Paceño with his walking cane, twenty first century Sucrenses followed through 
on their forefather’s threat of physical violence. On May 24, 2008, approximately forty 
indigenous supporters of Evo Morales, the recently elected indigenous president, were 
forced to walk shirtless to Sucre’s main plaza. Underneath the statues of Bolivia’s 
founding fathers and in front of the Casa de La Libertad, these indigenous men from 
rural Chuquisaca were beaten, taunted, and forced to burn cultural symbols of 
indigeneity.150 
This overt episode of racial violence followed contentious debates about the 
future of the Bolivian nation, and it was directly connected to the rejection of demands to 
return the seat of government to Sucre. The debate over the seat of government, called 
the Capitalia Plena, became the major symbolic issue for Sucre residents during the 
national assembly much like it had a century earlier during the Federal Revolution. Sucre 
residents published newspapers articles, wrote songs, filmed videos, and produced 
posters to discuss the return of the capital. 
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 Recent academic investigations into this episode of racial violence have noted the 
“paradox of history” that took place on May 24, 2008. These scholars have pondered how  
such a “shameful incident took place in front of the doors of the Casa de la Libertad 
(House of Liberty) in Sucre, where Bolivian independence was declared.”151 The 
juxtaposition of overt racial violence with a symbol of Bolivian liberty seemed to 
contradict the very principles on which the Bolivian nation was formed. However, this 
juxtaposition only seems contradictory if scholars fail to consider the ways Sucre 
residents have historically used memories of independence. In the city of Sucre, 
independence symbolism has rarely represented just liberty and freedom. Instead memory 
of independence has repeatedly been used to espouse “Sucrense exceptionalism” and to 
defend a political system that restricts the participation of large percentages of the 
Bolivian population. Therefore the episode of racial violence did not paradoxically take 
place at the foot of a site of memory of the Bolivian independence cause, but it was the 
most historically logical site for such an incident to take place. The city of Sucre has long 
used independence memory to defend their political platforms, and the May 24th incident 
is just the latest reincarnation of this phenomenon. 
 In order to truly understand “the short-term and long-term causes” of this violent 
act it is necessary to take seriously the local history of the city of Sucre.152 Sucrense elite 
have long used the memory of independence to assert and justify their political claims, 
and this trend dominated the discussions of the Capitalia Plena. In this chapter I will 
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show how the city of Sucre continued to use independence memory to define Sucrense 
identity and how these tropes impacted the debates over the Capitalia Plena during the 
2008 Bolivian national convention.  
Despite more than a one hundred year gap between the Federal Revolution of 
1899 and the 2008 episode of racial violence, the continuities in the two discourses are 
striking. The concessions made after the war by the victorious Liberal Party allowed for 
the continuation of a regional discourse of “Sucrense Exceptionalism” narrated through 
the stories of Bolivian independence. This persistent historical discourse has led to 
feelings of superiority for Sucre residents and has manifested itself in overtly racists and 
violent ways. The failure to truly reconcile after the 1899 federal revolution paved the 
way for these later episodes of violence and racism. Therefore, the former national 
narrative has mutated and now serves as an important regional discourse that defines 
Sucre. 
Following decades of neoliberal economic policy and numerous campaigns to 
eradicate coca leaf production, Bolivia was a nation facing massive turmoil in the first 
years of the twenty first century.153 Economic policy favoring privatization significantly 
hurt the average Bolivian’s ability to purchase necessities like water and gasoline. 
Further, income sources were drying up as the Bolivian mining industries struggled and 
coca leaf production came under attack from the United States’ war on drugs. Under 
these harsh social conditions, indigenous men and women began to wage wars of their 
own to challenge the Bolivian national policy.154 Following massive upheavals in 
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Cochabamba over access to water and violence in the streets of La Paz, Gonzalo Sanchez 
de Lozada, the then President of Bolivia who supported the neoliberal policies, was 
forced out of office in 2003 and fled to the United States of America. After ousting the 
President, the Bolivian people faced another era of nation building similar to the one the 
nation faced following the Federal Revolution of 1899. 
In an effort to build a more equitable nation, the Bolivian people demanded new 
elections, and in 2006 Evo Morales, a former coca leaf advocate, won the presidency 
with an absolute majority. This marked the first time in the Bolivian national history that 
a man who self-identified as indigenous would be hold the office of President. While Evo 
Morales’ election was celebrated internationally, some portions of the Bolivian did not 
support Morales’ presidency or the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), Morales’ 
political party.155 These opposing sides of the political debate clashed publically and the 
sides opposing the MAS often used racialized and racist depictions of indigeneity to 
condemn the new President.156 In this fractured atmosphere, a diverse group of 
representatives came to Sucre to discuss the future of the nation and to craft a new 
Constitution. 
On August 6, 2006 two hundred and fifty-five delegates from varied backgrounds 
came together in the city of Sucre to draft the nation’s new constitution. The atmosphere 
was tense as the Constitutional Assembly would have far ranging impacts on the Bolivian 
people. Further, the diverse mixture of people involved in the process drew the ire of 
many elite Bolivians. Bolivians were unaccustomed to seeing women, indigenous 
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speakers, and rural community leaders deciding the future of the nation, and this resulted 
in conflict during the crafting of the Constitution.157 As the process dragged on into 2007, 
opposition groups led by Sucre residents introduced a demand to return the seat of 
government to the city of Sucre and kicked off the Capitalia Plena debate. Sucre 
residents, and especially the students of the San Francisco Xavier University, quickly 
rallied around this demand and enthusiastically supported the motion to return the seat of 
government to Sucre. 
Just as Conservatives had a century earlier, the Sucre residents relied heavily on 
the independence memory to justify their demands. The independence tropes continued to 
serve as important memories to claim a Sucrense exceptionalism and to demand respect 
from the rest of the Bolivian nation. Jaime Barron, the principal of the San Francisco 
Javier University, gave an influential speech on May 10, 2007 to kick off an important 
march in support of the Capitalia plena. Throughout his speech, employed the 
independence discourse to justify the city’s demands and to endow the Sucrense people 
with a noble past. While describing the Chuquisaqueno people, Barron suggested that 
they “carried in their veins the blood of the first cry of independence.”158 In a region 
where purity of blood has long had a strong social significance, the use of the blood 
metaphor was an attempt to claim social status for Sucre residents. Since the blood of the 
nation’s founding fathers ran through their veins, the Sucrense people were ideally suited 
to lead the new Bolivian nation, according to Barron.159 
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Further, Barron directly quoted the 1839 provision naming Sucre the capital of 
Bolivia in his speech. Just as his Sucrense forefathers had a century earlier, Barron relied 
on the governmental actions of the founding fathers to justify his claim that Sucre was the 
ideal place for the national government to reside in Bolivia. Not only were Sucrense 
people of noble lineage, but the early founding fathers of Bolivia had declared the city of 
Sucre as the capital of Bolivia. This two-tiered approach not only relies on quasi-racial 
justifications, but it also used actual legislation to further justify the demands of the Sucre 
residents.  
 However, Barron’s most passionate claim for the return of the capital discussed 
the parallels between the birth of the nation and the current conditions. Barron 
passionately claimed that “[i]t is in Chuquisaca, and in particular in the city of Sucre, 
where the National and Continental project of equality, liberty, and sovereignty took form 
with the foundation of the Republic and the birth of the social consciousness of 
Bolivia…and today it is Chuquisaca, and the city of Sucre, where we have returned to 
think about the concept of what nation we want, the concept of a renovated Bolivia.”160 
By drawing parallels between the two nation-building eras, Barron implicitly argues that 
the city of Sucre and its residents are the best suited leaders for the Bolivian nation. 
Continuously, this independence centered discourse has claimed an exceptional character 
for Sucrenses for political purposes. These discourses suggest that Sucrenses are the most 
qualified to discuss what direction the Bolivian nation should go, which in effect 
significantly constrains the principles of equality and liberty that the Sucrenses claim to 
be so adept at representing. 
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The independence discourse, which was re-invigorated during the Capitalia Plena 
debates, grew even greater during the build up to the two hundredth anniversary of the 
May 25th uprising in Sucre. Variations of the discourse were disseminated to the general 
population of Sucre in a number of forms. Similar tropes soon emerged in popular songs 
like Charlon Martinez’s song “La Sede Si Se Mueve” and Huascar Aparcio Gonzales’s 
“Aires de Libertad” and “Grito de Libertad.”161  
In Huascar Aparicio’s “Cry of Liberty” the lyrics call Sucre the “cradle of liberty” 
and he makes direct reference to the ignored heroes of May 25, 1809. Further, he makes 
the claim that “cry for freedom was conceived in Sucre’s stomach.” Once again these 
tropes show the continuation of the discourse that places Sucre at the center of a Bolivian 
origin story. It was in Sucre that the idea of Bolivia was conceived of and where it grew 
into adulthood. Aparicio’s lyrics even hint at the political call to action inherent in the 
discourse when he calls for fellow Capitalinos to raise their hands. 
Cry of Liberty 
By: Huascar Aparicio Gonzales 
 
To the land that saw my birth 
I propose a toast in homage 
To Sucre the capital of the Bolivian fatherland 
For your Colonial Airs, the belle of South America 
 
You are the cradle of liberty 
City of the four names 
In your stomach the cry for freedom was conceived 
For brave heroes ignored, for May 25 
 
I do not want people to forget you 
I do not want them to insult you 
Enough of what is believe by others 
That which by law you always were 
We raise our hands 
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Brothers from the capital 
 
LA LA lay LA lay LA LA LA... 
La lay la la la la... 
LA LA lay LA lay 
LA LA layy lay lay LA... 
 
We raise our hands 
Brothers of the capital 
Dear Sucre that you give love without borders 
Thanks for showing to the world 
The heart of my land!162 
    
 
The citizens of Sucre truly gravitated to the tropes in Barron’s speeches and 
Aparicio’s songs, and the Capitalia Plena demand dominated talk surrounding the 
constitutional assembly in the city of Sucre. When the assembly discarded the Capitalia 
Plena debate in August of 2007, the atmosphere in the city of Sucre became tenser, and in 
November the Constitutional Assembly decided it was best if the assembly moved 
outside of the city limits. They chose to relocate to a military base on the outskirts of the 
city of Sucre. Sensing that the movement of the assembly was an attempt to further table 
the debate over the Capitilia Plena, the Sucrense people took to the streets to demand that 
the assembly return to the Gran Mariscal Theater and discuss the debate over the capital. 
During this tense moment military forces attempted to block the masses of young 
Sucrenses and conflict erupted. Numerous people were injured and three young Sucre 
residents were killed during the brief conflict which was later called La Calancha. 
Already feeling slighted by the failure of their Capitalia Plena campaign, the Sucre 
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residents saw the La Calancha as a direct offense against their city. This event set the 
stage for the May 24, 2008 episode of racial violence which served to open this chapter.  
As the Sucre residents publicly attacked and humiliated the indigenous supports 
of Evo Morales on May 24, 2008, Sucrenses chanted “This is Sucre. Sucre is respected, 
damn it” after singing the Himno a Chuquisaca in front of the Casa de Libertad.163 Like 
the Conservative elite of the nineteenth century and Jaime Baron, these Sucrenses 
claimed that they were exceptional and demanded to be respected. They too relied 
heavily on the memories of independence to make these claims. The Himno a 
Chuquisaca, which was written to commemorate the one hundredth anniversary of the 
May 25th uprising, makes direct reference to Chuquisaca’s role in the independence 
movements. Further, the crowd strategically took the indigenous victims to the front of 
the Casa de La Libertad to perform their rituals of racialized violence.164 
While this is the most publicized episode of racism  in the city of Sucre, scholars 
have noted that the city of Sucre plays host to daily incidents of “silent racism” that go 
unreported.165  These incidents of daily racism are found on the street, in the city’s 
restaurants, and in bumper stickers throughout Sucre. In the following picture, the 
expression of regional pride directly challenges the idea that being an Oligarch is a bad 
thing. By stating “100% Chuquisacaqueno… Oligarch and what,” this bumper stick 
reifies the idea that residents of Sucre have a higher social status than other Bolivians.166 
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Further, the antagonistic stance that being an Oligarch is not a negative label shows that 
Sucrense still view themselves as most qualified to lead the Bolivian nation. 
Following the dismissal of their demands and the empowerment of the MAS 
Party, Sucre residents felt that they had not been given the respect they rightfully 
deserved. Their demands for the capital had been ignored, Sucre students had been 
victimized in La Calancha, and indigenous men and women from rural Chuquisaca chose 
to side with the indigenous President Evo Morales instead of the opposition forces in 
Sucre. These short term catalysts sparked the May 24th incident, but the long term 
reliance on independence memory and the heartfelt belief in Sucrense exceptionalism that 
this discourse fostered help to explain why Sucre residents did not feel respected. Relying 
on the tried and true strategy of using the memory of independence exploits, Sucrenses 
once again asserted their exceptionalism and claimed they were most qualified to lead the 
Bolivian nation throughout the Capitialia Plena debate. After these demands were not 
met, Sucrenses turned to physical violence and humiliation to express their frustration 
and assert their continued view that they should control the future of the Bolivian nation. 
A year after the incident in the Plaza 25 de Mayo, Sucre residents celebrated the 
bicentennial of the first cry for Bolivian independence. It was a festive atmosphere full of 
celebration, but one of the official posters for the event reflected the political and social 
events that had dominated the city over the previous year. In the artistic depiction, Sucre 
residents are surrounded by smoke and are being restrained by police. The symbolism 
clearly is a direct reference to the events that took place in La Calancha, where the three 
Sucre residents fell victim to the police efforts to contain the hoard of Sucrense students. 
However, standing out above the scenes of victimization in the poster is a woman, 
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playing the modern day part of Juana Azurduy, about to defiantly lead a charge in 
defense of the exploited Sucre residents. 
The events of La Calancha and those of May 25, 1809 are placed together on this 
poster celebrating the 200th anniversary of the former date. In what is clearly a political 
statement, the designers of this mass produced poster once again have appropriated the 
memory of independence to assert Sucrense identity and to make political claims. In this 
case, the symbolic Capitalina (the woman representing Sucre) is taking a stand against 
the violence and disrespect that the Sucrense felt they had unjustifiably received. Perhaps 
unknowingly, the organizers of this event chose to rely on the same imagery that the 
Conservative had a century early. Whether intentional or not, the episodes of racial 
violence in 2008 show that the public discourses of independence and Sucrense 
exceptionalism continue to have real and violent consequences much as they did in the 
late nineteenth century.
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EPILOGUE 
 During multiple nation building episodes in Bolivian history, Sucrense elite have 
used independence memory to justify their privileged place in the Bolivian nation. Their 
Bolivian origin story, which focused on May 25, 1809 and the actions of Chuquisaca 
residents in the independence battles, has often been used to defend oligarchical and 
exclusionary political arrangements. In the years leading up to the 1899 federal 
revolution, Sucre elite enhanced these pre-existing narratives to defend the Conservative 
oligarchy and their political policies. Despite losing this battle, the Sucre elite were able 
to continue this discursive project after the war ended. In an effort to foster a smooth 
reconciliation Liberals allowed these cultural projects to continue, and the memories 
proliferated as the Centennial arrived in 1909. As an unintended consequence of this 
Liberal concession, Sucrenses have continued to use independence memory to assert their 
exceptionalism within the Bolivian nation. This perceived exceptionalism backed by the 
invented May 25th traditions, placed the city of Sucre at the center of the Bolivian origin 
story and has been used this to justify their control over the Bolivian political sphere. 
 
 The history of the independence memory and discourse in Sucre is largely a tragic 
and disappointing tale. Recently, scholars have critiqued the Latin American historical 
profession for continuing to rely on tragic, declensionist narratives to discuss the history 
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of the region.167 However, it is difficult not to have an air of the tragic when analyzing 
independence memory in Sucre. Elite in the city have used these memories to justify 
oligarchs, exclusionary political arrangements, and racial violence. Nevertheless, 
independence discourse has not been appropriated solely by the elite for oppressive 
purposes. As Sucrense elite disseminated these memories to assert their exceptionalism, 
other social groups read, heard, or saw portions of these discourses. Sensing the political 
and economic utility of independence memory others groups have repurposed similar 
tropes for their own political ends. This intertextuality has resulted in what linguistic 
anthropologist have called intertextual gaps, or divergences in meaning and purpose, 
between the original discourse and the repurposed ones.168 In the Chuquisaca case, 
independence memory, which originally served to restrict political participation and 
defend exclusionary regimes, has been re-contextualized by indigenous communities to 
demand more encompassing economic and political systems.  
 About two hours outside of the city of Sucre, the rural, indigenous community of 
Tarabuco has also chosen the Bolivian wars for independence as their town’s emblematic 
memory. The Tarabuco’s main streets are named after independence figures, they 
perform independence annually during Carnival, and their plaza has a statue of a soldier 
from the independence era. The town has even used memories of independence to 
generate tourism and gain international recognition by Unesco.169 These men and women 
from rural Chuquisaca have found ways to reclaim the same memories of independence 
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that were used during the humiliation of indigenous Chuquisacaquenos in the city of 
Sucre. Perhaps in the future, independence memory will help to contest the oppression, 
exclusion, and racism that it has traditionally been used to justify.  
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